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The focus of my thesis is how the ‘war on terrorism’ was discursively constructed as the ap-
propriate response to the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001. To answer this re-
search question, a discourse analysis was undertaken of six of President George W. Bush’s 
speeches and one official strategy document by the Bush administration.  
 
The background for my thesis is that the US today is a hegemon with the power to do virtu-
ally whatever it wants, and thus it is important to understand what it does and how it does it. 
However, in this study my focus is on from what premises and worldview the hegemon starts. 
This thesis is thus an attempt to reframe the ‘war on terrorism’. 
 
I start from a specific constructionist epistemological assumption, namely that our under-
standing and knowledge about the world is historically and culturally contingent. The focal 
point of the analysis is on the discursive construction of the ‘war on terrorism’ and on giving 
a critical review of this construction by exposing the contingency of particular representations 
of ‘us’ and ‘them’. The particular representations identified in my material are the structured 
oppositions of freedom and fear, good and evil and civilization and barbarism. 
 
I argue that the key component in discursively constructing the war is continuous discursive 
reinforcement of a simplistic dualism between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Furthermore, I suggest that 
‘us’ and ‘them’ are not only differentiated and set in opposition to each other; a hierarchy is 
also imposed where the subordinate sign (‘them’) is placed outside the boundaries of what is 
desirable. I view reasoning in this manner with a simplistic paired zero-sum relation between 
‘us’ and ‘them’ as a blueprint for heightened difference and conflict. I view it as an attempt to 
unite through the logic of confrontation: either you are with ‘us’ against ‘them’, or you are 
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1. Introduction 
A war on terrorism was verbally declared by US President G.W. Bush on 11 September 2001 
(Bush, 2001a). This was a reaction to the attacks performed by 19 hijackers who flew two pas-
senger aeroplanes into the World Trade Center in New York, one plane into the Pentagon, 
while a fourth plane crashed in a field in Pennsylvania. Almost 3,000 people were killed in this 
tragic but spectacular way. That such an attack could happen in a nation that spends almost 
unimaginable amounts of money on national security, and that it could happen at this moment 
in time, came as a shock in the West.  
Seeing on television, over and over again, the two planes crashing and people in New 
York throwing themselves out of the burning towers, naturally made a huge impact not only on 
Americans. From a Western perspective, these were ‘people like us’ and when something hor-
rific happens to ‘us’ it evokes an enormous empathy and sympathy. On the other hand, millions 
of people slowly dying of hunger and disease or tens of thousands dying in an earthquake in 
some remote corner of the earth do not necessarily stir up the same response. To make such a 
comparison is by no means to diminish the atrociousness of what happened that day in the US. 
Rather, it indicates something that we all do – we seem to grieve more profoundly over our own, 
over ‘our people’, than we do over ‘the others’.  It seems that the distinction between ‘us’ and 
‘them’ is a more powerful mechanism in social life than for example the distinction between 
‘just’ and ‘unjust’.  
The US’s response to the terrorist attacks was the ‘war on terrorism’, where the enemy, to 
a large degree, was not exhaustively defined, as the Bush administration made a polarized dis-
tinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Shortly after 11 September 2001, President Bush declared 
(Bush, 2001b):  
Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the ter-
rorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbour or support terrorism will be regarded by 
the United states as a hostile regime. (2:5:16-19)1 
Furthermore, this polarization was framed in terms of a moral dualism between good and evil 
(Bush, 2001a): 
Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature. And we responded with the best of America 
[…] we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world (1:1:18-2:21). 
Finally, the distinction between respectively ‘civilised’ and ‘barbaric’ , and between ‘freedom’ 
and ‘fear’, is an important line of division, separating the world into two different spheres with 
different moralities (Bush, 2001b): 
                                                 
1 Reference code for Text 2, page 5 lines 16-19 of my empirical material. I explain my code further in 4.1. 
  
This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight […] And in our grief and anger we have found our mis-
sion and our moment. Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom – the great achievement 
of our time, and the great hope of every time ─ now depend on us. Our nation ─ this generation ─ will lift a 
dark threat of violence from our people and our future. (2:6:11-8:21). 
My interest with this thesis’ subject was not sparked by the terrorist attacks in New York and 
Washington in September 2001 in themselves. My reaction to the attacks was one of shock, 
disbelief and enormous sympathy for all of the people involved. Rather, my interest and concern 
were sparked by the way in which President Bush made sense to the American people (via tele-
vision) of what had happened, thus creating the official US framework for responding to these 
events. In crisis situations, such as the 11 September 2001 events, the state’s leadership is ex-
pected to provide not only an explanation, but also a solution. Under such circumstances the 
words of the president are spoken on behalf of the nation, thus carrying authority and power.  
The quotes above are examples of a meaning-making process that triggered my interest in 
this material. I was concerned with how quickly the 11 September attacks and the ‘war on ter-
rorism’ became synonymous, as if there was no need to separate the two. This is important in 
my view because, despite how horrific the 11 September events were, they did not grant carte 
blanche for how to respond. My interest was therefore in how a response to terrorism was con-
structed, how President Bush in a particular historical moment constructed a narrative where it 
was taken for granted that ‘us’ going to war against ‘them’ was the natural, obvious and only 
right thing to do. Underpinning my interest in the construction of the ‘war on terrorism’ was a 
specific methodological assumption: that our understanding and knowledge of the world is his-
torically and culturally contingent. That is, our knowledge and representations of the world 
could have been different and they can change. This is an important distinction in my view, 
because as time passes since the terrorist attacks in the US, many people tend simply to accept 
the so-called ‘war on terrorism’ with its tragic consequences as ‘just the way things are’ (a mat-
ter of fact). It was dissatisfaction with this line of reasoning that made me want to investigate 
how this war came to life, how it became a ‘truth’ that was no longer critically discussed. In my 
presentation in chapter two of the epistemological departure point, I will draw on the construc-
tionist assumption that in a ‘war on terrorism’, as in the social world in general, there are no 
objective ‘truths’ but only socially constructed ‘facts’ that compete to establish a monopoly over 
what is true and false. President Bush has his ‘order of things’ and it is not for me to claim that 
they are false, as that is an impossibility from a constructionist point of view, but it is validated 
by its own regime of truth. Different understandings of the world lead to different actions, which 
is to say that the construction of knowledge and ‘truth’ has social consequences. Bush, being 
  
president of today’s sole superpower, thus has great power to convey his constructed ‘truth’, 
with the consequences that entails. I will therefore focus on President Bush’s point of view as 
delivered in selected documents.  
On 20 September 2001, President Bush conveyed his perspective to a Joint Session of 
Congress and the American People, centred around the question ‘Americans are asking, why do 
they hate us?’ (Bush, 2001b): 
They hate what they see right here in this chamber – a democratically elected government. Their leaders are 
self-appointed. They hate our freedoms – our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to 
vote and assemble and disagree with each other. (2:4:15-18). 
This might have been intended as a rhetorical question or even as an unanswerable question, but 
when President Bush posed this question he invited interpretations as to why ‘they’ could do 
something so dreadful to ‘us’. It could also be argued that the question could be seen as an an-
swer in itself: by working as a one-way mirror it took away the possibility for ‘us’ to see our-
selves as ‘they’ do and it forcefully closes the door on any nuanced analysis of ‘us’. Some 
commentators were provoked by President Bush’s answer and have been quite stark in their 
assessment of reasons for the Bush administration to see the perspective of ‘the other’, disagree-
ing with President Bush that ‘they’ hate America for her values. Indian novelist Arundhati Roy 
is a case in point: 
Could it be that the stygian anger that led to the attacks has its root not in American freedom and democ-
racy, but in the US government’s record of commitment and support to exactly the opposite things – to 
military and economic terrorism, insurgency, military dictatorship, religious bigotry and unimaginable 
genocide? (Roy quoted in Gregory, 2004: 24).  
However, my analytical focus is not on these questions and counter-questions, but rather on 
trying to understand the dichotomies reproduced through them. Thus, this thesis is itself an ef-
fort to deconstruct the oppositional structuring in the ‘war on terrorism’. My focal point is on 
the US and President Bush and I do not consider ‘the others’’ representations of the world. This 
does not suggest that I think representations from ‘them’ are less important or interesting; they 
are simply not to my purpose here. Although the topics of the terrorist attacks and the ‘war on 
terrorism’ have been the focus of many scholars, I will argue that this specific research is impor-
tant because the US is today a hegemon that does virtually whatever it wants. It is therefore 
necessary to understand what it does, and how it does it. However, the importance of this study 





Therefore the research question that I would like to answer in this thesis is:  
 
How was a ‘war on terrorism’ constructed as the appropriate response by the US to the 
terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001? 
 
In an attempt to answer this research question, an empirical analysis was needed. Guided by the 
purpose of my research to analyse the construction of the ‘war on terrorism’, a methodology of 
discourse analysis was chosen. Methodology is here understood as the research design that lies 
behind my choice and use of method, and also links the choice and use of this method to the 
desired outcome (Crotty, 1998:3). Following this, the specific method of qualitative content 
analysis was chosen. Furthermore, there is a theoretical perspective informing my methodology 
of discourse analysis. Theoretical perspective can be viewed as the philosophical stance lying 
behind the chosen methodology, which provides a context for the research design and grounds 
its logic and criteria (Crotty, 1998). Finally, there is an epistemology, a theory of knowledge, 
embedded in my theoretical perspective and thereby in my methodology. Thus generally speak-
ing, the epistemology informs the theoretical perspective, which in turn informs the methodol-
ogy that guides the choice of method. However, in undertaking discourse analysis these four 
elements are not always so easily separated. As, for example, Neumann points out, in discourse 
analysis there is no sharp distinction between theory and method (Neumann, 2001:14). This 
feature of discourse analysis is also emphasized by Jørgensen and Phillips, who state that theory 
and method are intertwined in discourse analysis and that researchers must accept the basic phi-
losophical premises in order to apply discourse analysis as their method of empirical study (Jør-
gensen and Phillips, 2002: 4). Regardless of this apparent muddle, I will in the next three chap-
ters first outline my epistemological and methodological starting point. I will then move on to 
my theoretical framework and finally my chosen method. My hope is that these first chapters 
will act as a sufficient and coherent foundation from which the new knowledge to be presented 








2. Discourse Analysis: Epistemology and Methodology 
This thesis expresses general interest in how knowledge, truth and meaning are constituted and a 
specific interest in how President Bush constructed a ‘war on terrorism’ through the use of 
words. The words of the president’s speeches articulate a certain worldview, resting on particu-
lar assumptions and beliefs. Language is thus the focal point of the analysis, taking as a starting 
point the general idea that language is structured according to different patterns and that it is in 
the concrete use of language that the patterns are created, reproduced and changed. Discourse 
analysis is the analysis of these patterns. However, as Jørgensen and Phillips argue, discourse 
analysis is a heterogeneous field ─ that is, it is not just one approach but rather a series of inter-
disciplinary approaches. It can be applied to various social domains in several different types of 
studies (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002:1).  
As mentioned in the introduction, in discourse analysis, theory and method are inter-
twined. This implies that researchers have to accept a ‘complete package’ which includes four 
elements: epistemology; theoretical models; methodological guidelines; and specific techniques 
for analysis (methods). This means that discourse analysis cannot just be applied as a method for 
analysing data, in a more technical sense, but it has to be viewed as a theoretical and methodo-
logical whole (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 4). So when undertaking discourse analysis, one 
has to accept the notion of a whole package, but elements from different discourse analytical 
perspectives can be combined. The aim is to create one’s own package that will provide knowl-
edge about a specific research problem and together with other ‘packages’ produce a broader 
understanding of the research area. 
In this chapter I will first introduce four well-known basic constructionist principles that 
act as my epistemological starting point in this thesis. Second, I will provide an insight into the 
multiple definitions of the term ‘discourse’ and present my understanding of the concept. There-
after, I will discuss the relationship between the discursive and the non-discursive, which in turn 
leads to the question of relativism and reflexivity.  
 
2.1 Epistemology: Four Much Referred Principles in a Constructionist  
Approach  
The reason for introducing these principles is that a constructionist epistemology both opens up 
analytical possibilities but also puts constraints on knowledge claims that are made in its name. 
This will become apparent in the remaining sections of this chapter. A constructionist episte-
mology asserts the notion that we cannot find an objective truth about the social world, only 
  
different socially constructed perspectives that are more or less in fluctuation. The interest is not 
in how the world is ─ that being an ontological question ─ but more how these perspectives 
came about, how they are sustained and how they are challenged by other perspectives. In this 
thesis I adhere to the following four principles that are to some extent interconnected and as 
mentioned also have consequences for the knowledge claims that can and will be presented in 
this project. The following is based on Burr (2003) and also Jørgensen and Phillips (2002), 
which both refer to Gergen (1985) as their primary source. 
 
2.1.1 Be Critical to Taken-for-Granted Knowledge: The War on Terrorism as a Result of 
the Construction of Truths  
This principle is based on the view that we should be critical to taken-for-granted understand-
ings of the world, including our own. The taken-for-granted is by definition something that is 
seen as unproblematic and also as something that one does not even think can be seen as prob-
lematic. The taken-for-granted are naturalized ascriptions of meaning that set limits for possible 
ways of thinking and acting. In constructionism our knowledge of the world should not be 
treated as an objective truth. Furthermore, the view is that reality is only accessible to us through 
categories, so our knowledge and representations of the world are not reflections of a reality out 
there but rather they are products of our ways of categorizing the world (Jørgensen and Phillips, 
2002: 5). In this thesis this critical stance towards the taken-for-granted is viewed as a guiding 
principal throughout the research process. When approaching the ‘war on terrorism’, the ques-
tion becomes how the representations of the taken-for-granted are (re)presented. Because the 
taken-for-granted is seen as something naturalized, it can be difficult to identify. I discuss the 
methodological consequences of this principle for my study in chapter three. 
 
2.1.2 Historical and Cultural Specificity  
The second epistemological principle is that the categories and representations that we use to 
understand the world are historically and culturally specific (Burr, 2003: 3-4). Our knowledge, 
identities and worldviews are contingent, hence they could have been different and they can 
change over time. As opposed to a foundationalist view, where knowledge is seen as grounded 
on a solid metatheoretical base, the position here is anti-foundationalist, in the sense that knowl-
edge is seen as historically and culturally contingent (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 5-6). There-
fore the understanding and knowledge presented by President Bush regarding the situation after 
the terrorist attacks in September 2001 should be seen as positioned in time and space. As men-
tioned above, a starting point in this thesis is the idea that language, and thus discourse, is struc-
  
tured according to different patterns, and that it is in the concrete use of language that the pat-
terns are created, reproduced and changed. Hence, discourse is viewed as ‘forms of social ac-
tions’ that shape some part of the production of the social world, including the knowledge, iden-
tities and social relations, and thus maintain specific social patterns. This way of thinking is 
anti-essentialist, in the sense that the social world is constructed socially and discursively. This 
implies that the character of the social world is not pre-given or determined by external condi-
tions and that there are no fixed essences inside things or people that make them what they are 
(Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). This view of all things being in flux provokes the question of 
how it then is possible to do scientific research. Jørgensen and Phillips suggest that the answer is 
that even though knowledge is always contingent in principle, it is always relatively inflexible in 
specific situations (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). This set of problems will be discussed further 
under the heading of relativism and reflexivity in chapter 2.4. 
 
2.1.3 Knowledge is Sustained by Social Processes  
Following the principle above, the question of where our common understandings and knowl-
edge of the world comes from surfaces. The answer that constructionism gives is that people 
construct it between them (Burr, 2003: 4). It is through social interaction that our versions of 
knowledge and understandings are constructed. Therefore, in a study like this one, social inter-
action ─ here in the form of language in use by President Bush’s speeches addressed to an ab-
stract public ─ is of great interest. It is through social interaction that we construct common 
truths and compete about what is true and false.  
 
2.1.4 Link between Knowledge and Social Action  
These negotiations of truths can take different forms, thus opening up several possible construc-
tions of the world. Within these constructs there are rules for acceptable and unacceptable ac-
tions, hence the social construction of truth and knowledge has social consequences (Burr, 2003: 
5). This principle is of vital importance, because it was through constructing a particular under-
standing and knowledge of the situation that made the act of going to war in Afghanistan ac-
ceptable in the world community.  
 
2.2 Defining Discourse  
An often-used example in an initial attempt to understand the concept of discourse is to think of 
so called ‘expert’ languages. Medical practitioners, for example, draw on an expert medical 
language that allows them to identify symptoms, make diagnoses and prescribe therapy. This 
  
language is not easily accessible to people who are not medically trained (Tonkiss, 1998: 248). 
By excluding all non-medically trained people, this is an example of a homogeneous discourse. 
Another example is the saying ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ (Edwards, 
2004:166). This is an example of heterogeneous discourse, meaning that in one discourse a per-
son is defined as a terrorist and in another the same person is defined as a freedom fighter. 
However, in order to clarify what discourses are, how they function and how to analyse them, I 
want to go beyond these initial understandings of the term discourse.  
As I will show in the next chapter, discourse analysis can be viewed as having its roots in 
the critique of structuralism in France in the late 1960s. A central contributor in this critique was 
Michel Foucault. Foucault is still used today, and perhaps sometimes misused, in attempts to 
define and analyse discourse across the humanities and social sciences. What is certain is that he 
is recognized as having a decisive influence in the development of discourse analysis (Fair-
clough, 2003: 123, Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 12, Neumann, 2001: 13). When commenting 
on his own use of the term discourse, Foucault writes: 
Instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word ‘discourse’, I believe I have in fact 
added to its meanings; treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an indi-
vidualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of 
statements (Foucault quoted in Neumann, 2001:17).  
The term ‘discourse’ is here used abstractly for ‘the general domain of statements’ and more 
specifically for ‘groups of statements’ or for the ‘regulated practice’, meaning the rules that 
govern such a group of statements. I see this last point as central, and it goes to my overall inter-
est in the structure of the rules of truth claims (re)presented by President Bush in different dis-
courses in the ‘war on terrorism’. As briefly mentioned in the introduction, in constructionism 
truth is regarded as a discursive construct and different regimes of knowledge establish what is 
true and false. Another quote from Foucault might highlight this point: 
We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation. 
[…Discourse] is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence 
can be defined. Discourse in this sense is not an ideal, timeless form […] it is, from the beginning to end, 
historical – a fragment of history […] posing its own limits, its divisions, its transformations, the specific 
modes of its temporality (Foucault quoted in Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 12).  
As I have argued, defining ‘discourse’ can be done in several ways, from the examples at the 
beginning of this chapter to Foucault’s more complex definitions. Before I present the prelimi-
nary definition of discourse that I will apply in this thesis, I want to indicate two more notions 
introduced by Jørgensen and Phillips concerning how to view the concept of discourse.  
  
First, they suggest that we should, to a greater extent, treat discourse as an analytical concept, 
thus as an entity that the researcher projects onto the reality in order to create a framework for 
study. This means that the delimitation of where one discourse in my empirical material ends 
and another begins is determined strategically in relation to the research aim. In the case of this 
thesis, the research aim (the deconstruction of a ‘war on terrorism’) has delimited the relevant 
discourse to President Bush’s speeches. Yet, this remains a theoretical exercise, as these 
speeches cannot actually be detached from a wider context.   
Second, this view of how to delimit discourses involves understanding discourses as ob-
jects that I construct rather than as objects that exist in a delimited form in reality, ready to be 
discovered and mapped (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 143-144). The way that I relate to them is 
mediated through my own perspective. 
At this stage I will follow Jørgensen and Phillips’ preliminary definition of discourse, un-
derstood ‘as a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or aspects of the 
world)’ (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 1). Here, the ‘way of talking’ is understood in a construc-
tionist sense and is based on a general idea concerning language that will be presented in chapter 
3.1 as the ‘linguistic turn’, where our ways of talking are not seen as neutrally reflecting our 
world, identities and social relations. Rather, our ways of talking have an active role in creating 
and changing them. ‘Understanding the world’ relates to the view that discourses can be seen as 
ways of representing aspects of the world, as different knowledge claims that struggle to appear 
as the understanding of the world. I choose to apply this general definition at this stage because 
in my view it is an open and inclusive definition, in chapter 3.2 I will, however, elaborate on my 
understanding of discourse.  
 
2.3 The Discursive and the Non-discursive. What about Reality?  
Discourses are ‘practices that form the objects of which they speak’. This apparently circular 
statement sums up the relation between discourse and the world of ‘things’ that we inhabit 
(Burr, 2003: 64). The relationship between the discursive and the non-discursive, the latter being 
the physical world around us, is viewed differently by various discourse analytical approaches 
(Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 18-21, and Burr, 2003: 81-82). It can be difficult to conceptualize 
the relationship between the discursive and reality. Some might claim that ‘discourse is all there 
is’, while others try to incorporate non-discursive theories into their analysis. Neumann points 
out that discourse analysis is focused on how and why things appear to be a certain way, thus it 
is an epistemological question. How we know the world is therefore the focus of the analysis, 
while the ontological question of what the world is becomes less important (Neumann, 2001: 
  
14). In this thesis the tension inherent in the constructionist epistemology concerning this rela-
tionship is recognized, but the focus of this thesis is on the discursive. As stated at the beginning 
of this chapter, the interest here is how categories and perspectives are discursively constructed 
and not how the world really is.  
 
2.4. Relativism and Reflexivity  
As I have argued above, a constructionist epistemology rejects the possibility of absolute 
knowledge and a final universalistic truth. Following an anti-foundationalist premise leads to the 
view that all knowledge is historically and culturally embedded and that truth is a discursive 
effect rather than a transparent account of reality. Thus, our understandings and knowledge 
about the world are viewed as historically and culturally contingent ─ that is, they are possible, 
but not necessary.  
The inherent relativism in constructionism has been criticized: claims have been made 
that constructionism is unsuitable both scientifically and politically. It is viewed as scientifically 
unsuitable because it cannot determine what is true and what is false. Politically, the critique 
goes to the alleged inability to determine what is good and what is bad (Kjørup, 2001). In this 
section I draw heavily on Jørgensen and Phillips and I agree with their notion that this critique is 
too pessimistic in its assessment of constructionism (2002: 175-211). I will come back to this 
criticism at the end of this section.  
However, the critique above prompts a discussion concerning discourse analysis’s poten-
tial for producing knowledge. One aspect concerns the consequences of adopting a construction-
ist epistemology when conducting a research project. Reflexive strategies can be of assistance in 
pursuit of producing an as-good-a-representation of the world as possible despite the inherent 
relativism in constructionism. In chapter 4.4 I will discuss in more detail how reflexive princi-
ples aided the selection and handling of my empirical material, and in chapter 3.2 I will elabo-
rate on how theoretical starting points can also function reflectively. Here I will point out that 
reflexivity, in the sense of the researcher being aware of her or his own role in the research 
process and the evaluation of results in relation to their consequences, is an important principle 
that should follow the researcher throughout the research process. This relates to the notion that 
a researcher is not in a position simply to observe the world as it ‘really’ is and give a transpar-
ent account of reality. There is an inherent perspectivism, because a researcher always ‘comes 
from somewhere’ and the researcher’s knowledge production is as productive as all other dis-
courses ─ that is, it creates reality at the same time as representing it. 
  
Another aspect of the status of knowledge that is produced by a discourse-analytical approach 
concerns the constructionist epistemological starting point, with its critical stance towards taken-
for-granted knowledge and understandings of the world. The question then becomes: why do I 
want to identify the taken-for-granted? One answer is that, as a minimum, critiques in construc-
tionism can be seen as the unmasking of naturalized taken-for-granted understandings of the 
world. Following this, the aim is to create distance between the researcher and the taken-for-
granted and thus to make naturalized categories visible as an object of study. I will show this in 
more detail in chapter 3.2. In this project, because the discourses under study were familiar to 
me both culturally and temporarily, a challenge was to treat them as discourses – that is, as so-
cially constructed meaning systems. Different strategies for identifying the taken-for-granted 
provide an epistemological base from which knowledge can be produced. But questions remain: 
What status should be awarded to this new knowledge that I as a researcher produce? How can I 
guarantee that the understanding that I present of reality is better that the one that I am criticiz-
ing? A further question is: How can I invest my claims with academic authority and political 
force without reference to a fixed foundation of knowledge? Here the question again arises con-
cerning whether the inherent relativism in constructionism makes it impossible to distinguish 
good descriptions of reality from the not-so-good, and progressive political principles from reac-
tionary ones.  
Following Jørgensen and Phillips, I will point to two main features: namely, either em-
bracing relativism; or making efforts to circumscribe relativism (2002:196-201). With an un-
conditional embrace of relativism, it could be argued that critical research is not possible, be-
cause all statements about the world would then be viewed as equally good. In attempts to cir-
cumscribe relativism, one could adhere to the relativist position that representations are socially 
constructed, but some are seen as more real than others. The problem then becomes who 
can/should be the judges deciding which representations are better than others.  
This negotiation of relativism can also be related to the principle of objectivity in science. 
From a relativist standpoint, objectivity becomes problematic because, as mentioned above, 
knowledge always ‘comes from’ somewhere, from a perspective, and thus cannot be objective. 
Also, if all knowledge is historically and culturally embedded, then objectivity is impossible. 
Jørgensen and Phillips utilize feminist research as an example to highlight an opposition be-
tween relativism and objectivity (2002: 201-203). The point is that the researcher has to give an 
account of how and from where her or his own representations come ─ that is, within which 
historical and cultural context their knowledge is produced. In this way, it is possible to give a 
more objective and less distorted reading of the world.  
  
Again, problems arise because this understanding of reflexivity implies that it is possible for the 
researcher to give a transparent account of her or his role and the cultural and historical context. 
Consequently, this leads back to a researcher position where one can produce a transparent neu-
tral description of reality. It can seem as if there is no way out of these dilemmas and that there 
are only two choices: total acceptance of relativism with the consequence that there can be no 
judgement of the quality of scientifically produced knowledge and no difference between scien-
tific knowledge and other types of knowledge; or, by making efforts to get around relativism, 
ending up in a position where someone, perhaps scientists, are given the role of judging which 
representations of the world are more or less good and bad.  
Once more, I find Jørgensen and Phillips’ discussion fruitful. Their contribution is a divi-
sion into two levels: a level of principle; and a grounded concrete level (2002: 203-207). At the 
level of principle, scientific knowledge is bound by the same conditions as all other forms of 
knowledge ─ that is, it is historically and culturally specific and therefore contingent. This 
symmetry at the level of principle is vital, because it is difficult to have a democratic political 
discussion if an a priori distinction is made between those who have legitimate knowledge and 
those who do not. In this way, contingency at the level of principle opens up for continued dis-
cussion. However, at a grounded level things do not have to be constantly contingent. Utter-
ances are always articulated in specific contexts that actually set narrow boundaries for what is 
understood as meaningful and meaningless, and what is perceived as true and false. Jørgensen 
and Phillips propose the concept of critique to combine these two levels, and they see critique as 
a positioned opening for discussion. Critical research should therefore explicitly position itself 
and distance itself from alternative representations of the world, on the grounds that it strives to 
do something specific for specific reasons. But critical research should also at the same time 
emphasize that this particular representation of the world is just one among other possible repre-
sentations and hence is open for further discussion. The aim is simultaneously to keep the level 
of principle and the level of the concrete in perspective, so that scientific knowledge can be seen 
as a truth that can be discussed.   
My position is that it is rewarding to separate the notion of contingency into two levels 
and that these two levels can successfully be active at the same time. Actually, it is crucial that 
they are simultaneously kept in perspective, because that is what makes scientific knowledge 
production evolve. If we only operate at the level of principle, then we can never say something 
about anything, because everything is contingent. And if we only operate at the grounded level, 
then there is no room for discussion or change. Thus I believe that it is possible to defend a par-
ticular ‘truth’ in a specific case and understand ‘truth statements’ in principle as relational and 
  
contingent constructs at the same time. In my view, it is important to recognize the challenges 
that inherent perspectivism and relativism pose to constructionism, and thus the challenges for 
the epistemological status of all knowledge produced in more essentialist scientific traditions. 
As I see it, there are no final solutions to these problems, but different reflexive strategies can 
make the challenge less, or at least prevent us from forgetting that the problem exists. This is an 
important issue that needs to be debated, but I am, however, critical to a debate where adherents 
to constructionism and critics of it end up reading each other in an extreme manner. There is no 
creative value in that.2 
Thus, in this project I regard relativism as a principle to further discussion and debate, but 
I also recognize that boundaries and limits exist in concrete meaning-making. Still, in stretching 
these boundaries, I apply reflexive strategies in order to make the taken-for-granted visible – 
both in my empirical material and in my analytical perspective on it. 
The next chapter will introduce my theoretical framework, which will include a sugges-
















                                                 
2 One example among many others is the interchange between Carl Ratner (2004) and Barbara Zielke (2005) in 
Forum for Qualitative Social Research. 
  
3. Theoretical Framework  
The previous chapter introduced an interest in language and the meaning-making process in the 
construction of a ‘war on terrorism’. At the end of the previous chapter I discussed some chal-
lenges for conducting social research within a constructionist perspective, related to a notion of 
cultural and historical contingency. This chapter will present my theoretical framework, which I 
will argue opens up for social enquiry of a constructed and contingent social reality.  
This presentation will have three steps. First I will consider some ideas presented by the 
linguist Ferdinand de Saussure around the beginning of the last century. His understanding of 
language as a system that is not determined by the reality to which it refers is one of the funda-
mental principles of structuralism. Second, I will turn to two main points of critique of the struc-
turalist approach brought forward by poststructuralism. It is this critique of linguistic structural-
ism that brought with it a general ‘linguistic turn’ in the social sciences. A central aspect of the 
‘linguistic turn’ was to study social interaction where it took place, namely in language (Neu-
mann, 2001: 80). Therefore, in this thesis I treat the ‘linguistic turn’ as a door opener that acts as 
a necessary base for the third and final step in this chapter, where I expand on my theoretical 
framework for the empirical analysis. I will use the terms structuralism and poststructuralism 
below as if they were unitary approaches, even though they are both labels for several different 
approaches.  
 
3.1 The Linguistic Turn  
In both structuralist and poststructuralist philosophies, a starting point is that our access to real-
ity is always through language. Our way of talking is seen not only as reflecting our world, iden-
tities and social relations. Rather, language plays an active role in creating, maintaining and 
changing them. It is through language that we create representations that are not mere reflec-
tions of an already existing reality but also contribute to the construction of reality. These repre-
sentations are the models that we use to make sense of the world, and they can be viewed as 
socially produced ‘facts’ (Neumann, 2001: 33). Hence, things in the world do not have meaning 
in themselves but acquire meaning through our ways of representing them. This does not neces-
sarily imply that meanings and representations are not as real as physical objects, but they ac-
quire meaning through our ways of representing them. The question of a physical reality for 
representations is answered differently by various approaches within discourse analysis, and I 
discussed the relationship between the discursive and the non-discursive in the previous chapter. 
As mentioned, the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure understood language as a system and 
that this system is not determined by the reality to which it refers. De Saussure argued that 
  
meaning should be studied as a system of signs. Words derive their meaning from their place in 
such a system of signs and their relations to different signs in this system. So according to de 
Saussure, a thing is known by everything that it is not (Neumann 2001:18). De Saussure also 
argued that signs consist of two components: form and content. The form of a word, also called 
a signifier, is the sound or the image of a word. The content or signified is a concept that we 
attach to the signifier. Together these two make a sign. According to de Saussure, the relation-
ship between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary. The meanings that we attach to words 
are not inherent in them but are results of social conventions operating in a particular culture at a 
particular time. De Saussure saw the structure of signs as a social institution and therefore as 
changeable over time. This implies that the relationship between language and reality is also 
arbitrary (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 10). Take the sign ‘yellow’, for instance, where the form 
is different in different languages (for example the English form ‘yellow’ becomes ‘gul’ in 
Norwegian). Also the content of the sign ‘yellow’ can change, from a colour to being cowardly 
if used in a situation of being ‘yellow’. For de Saussure it was the stable and unchangeable sys-
tem of signs, what he called langue, that should be the object of scientific study. The other level 
in language, paroles, which are the signs people actually use in specific situations, was seen as 
too random to be studied scientifically (Neumann 2001: 19).  
Emerging as a reaction to some of the problems inherent in structuralism (such as disre-
gard for power in meaning-making or the question of where does change come from in such 
rigid structures), poststructuralism was advanced in the 1960s by authors such as Roland 
Barthes, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and others. Poststructuralism raises two main cri-
tiques to structuralism. First, it reject structuralism’s notion of language as a stable, unchange-
able and totalizing structure. In the poststructuralist view, structures do exist, but always in a 
temporary state. Poststructuralism follows de Saussure in the idea that signs derive their mean-
ing through their internal relations within a network of signs and not through their relation to 
reality. It also agrees that the meaning of a sign comes into being only in relation to at least one 
other sign. In poststructuralist theory, however, while meaning is entirely dependent on the 
presence of at least one other signifier, that second or third term by which we can know the 
meaning of the first is not given by nature and can change according to the context in which 
they are used. In poststructuralism, meaning is culturally contingent and a dynamic process. In 
structuralism, with the focus on underlying and fixed structures, it is problematic to understand 
change, for where would the change come from? The poststructuralist view, that the structures 
become changeable and the meaning of signs can alter in relation to one another, makes it pos-
sible to explain how change can occur (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002:11). 
  
The second critique follows the first and is directed at the sharp distinction between langue and 
parole in structuralism. In poststructuralist linguistic philosophy, this sharp distinction is re-
jected. In contrast to de Saussure’s view that parole is too random to be studied, poststructural-
ists emphasize that it is in the concrete use of language that the structure is created, reproduced 
and changed. The view is that it was in specific acts of speech that people draw on the structure, 
but that it was also here that people would challenge the structure by introducing alternative 
ideas for how to fix the meaning of signs (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 12). 
The ‘linguistic turn’ refers to how these modified linguistic ideas were utilized in the so-
cial sciences by applying them to the relationship of language, society and culture. In this thesis 
the ‘linguistic turn’ is seen as particularly important, because it provides the means to make the 
constructed nature of society visible.  
 
3.2 Oppositional Structuring – and the Unmasking of the Taken-for-granted  
The poststructural critique, leading to the loss of a fixed structure as the basis and direction for 
analysis and with it the notion of a culturally and historically contingent meaning, might at first 
sight not leave much space for social enquiry. However, in the following two sections I will 
discuss two related notions that both allow for an analysis of a constructed and contingent social 
reality. First, I will discuss meaning-making, seen as a disposition and procedure of the opposi-
tional structuring of signs, and how this procedure can lead to taken-for-granted understandings 
and knowledge of the world. Following this, I will argue for the critical potential of an effort to 
unmask the taken-for-granted through a theory of deconstruction. In this effort Laclau and 
Mouffe’s poststructuralist discourse theory can be useful, and I will introduce some of their 
most central analytical concepts.3 
In the late 1960s, the philosopher Jacques Derrida critiqued de Saussure’s structuralism. 
Derrida criticized the notion that a thing can be known only by what it is not. He agreed that the 
meaning of a sign comes into being only in the presence of at least one other signifier. Derrida’s 
critique was that the second or third term by which we can know the meaning of the first is not 
given by nature but by cultural and historical contingency (Gregory, 1989: xv-xvi). Ashley goes 
on to elaborate the meaning-making procedure critiqued by Derrida.  The procedure was named 
logocentrism and it is seen as a practical orientation and a procedure that at once presupposes, 
invokes, and effects a normalizing or taken-for-granted expectation. This procedure can be 
viewed as having at least two qualities. First, it regards a coherent sovereign voice as a central 
                                                 
3 My aim, however, is not a theoretical discussion of these concepts and my presentation is therefore based on 
secondary literature. 
  
interpretive orientation that provides a unified rational meaning and direction to the multiple 
interpretations of spatial and temporal history. Second, this sovereign voice is seen as an un-
problematic, extrahistorical identity that does not need any critical accounting (Ashley, 1989: 
261). In Derrida’s description of the logocentric procedure, the author or the text will reason by 
structuring signs in opposition. Examples of such oppositions are nature/culture, peace/war, 
domestic/international, us/them, inside/outside, good/evil, civilized/barbarian. These signs are 
not only differentiated and set in opposition to each other, but a hierarchy is also imposed where 
the subordinate sign is placed outside the boundaries of what is significant and desirable (Ash-
ley, 1989). Derrida proposed a method of deconstruction to expose the inevitability of the struc-
turing of paired concepts in opposition and opposed in a zero-sum relation.  
What Derrida is critiquing is the inability to see the historical and cultural contingency of 
the philosophical categories. As I discussed in chapter two, this is also a central aspect in a con-
structionist epistemology: our understandings and knowledge of the world could have been dif-
ferent. This thesis aims to explore how meanings in different discourses in the ‘war on terror-
ism’ were transformed from cultural to natural. An aim is thus to unmask taken-for-granted 
understandings in the ‘war on terrorism’ and transform them into potential objects for discussion 
and criticism and, eventually, open to change (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 178).  
Cynthia Weber presents an informative account of how Roland Barthes utilized the con-
cept of ‘mythologies’ to make sense of the transformation of the cultural into what appears to be 
universal, natural and purely empirical (Weber, 2005: 4-8). The myth function transforms a cul-
tural interpretation into a ‘natural fact’. This transformation is seen as a highly political practice 
that depends on different configurations of power. How power works to mythologize varies 
from context to context, but in a general sense, power works through myths by appearing to take 
the political out of the ideological. This is because something that appears to be natural and 
unchangeable also appears to be apolitical. However, according to Weber these ‘natural facts’ 
are the most intense political stories there are, because they remove themselves and their posi-
tion from political debate. This is why Barthes refers to myths as ‘depoliticized speech’ (Weber, 
2005).  
 
3.3 Discourse Theory as an Analytical Framework  
In an attempt to repoliticize the ‘war on terrorism’, I will not present any claims to truth. Rather, 
the aim is to expose the contingency in the meaning-making. This task is a challenge, because as 
I mentioned in the last chapter I am to some extent part of the culture under study and thus share 
some of the taken-for-granted understandings expressed in my empirical material. In order to 
  
identify the naturalized ascriptions of meaning, I need to distance myself from them in some 
way. In this task the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe can be a useful starting point. La-
clau and Mouffe’s theory can be viewed as both drawing on similar ideas to Derrida concerning 
the critique of structuralism for not seeing the historical and cultural contingencies implicit in 
the theory of language, and they also apply the method of deconstruction (Jørgensen and Phil-
lips, 2002: 48).  
Furthermore, Laclau and Mouffe also utilize a concept of myths. In my analytical attempt 
to identify the taken-for-granted, I will draw on what Jørgensen and Phillips refer to as ‘analyti-
cal redescription’, where Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of discourse can function as a ‘language 
of description’ to translate my empirical material (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 189). Concepts 
from Laclau and Mouffe’s theory can be seen as a form of language that can describe my em-
pirical material in a different manner from the way in which it describes itself, thus giving me 
the required distance to the material.  
I will not aim to give a complete account of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory; rather 
I will highlight some general features of their theory that are relevant for this specific project. In 
my analytical chapters I will introduce and explain applicable concepts from Laclau and 
Mouffe’s theory in the most useful order for functioning as a ‘language of description’. I build 
my account of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory from the very informative illustration 
given in Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 24-59 and 176-212) and where specifically referred to 
from Howarth and Stavrakakis (Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis, 2000: 1-23).  
Laclau and Mouffe appropriate and modify two major theoretical traditions: Marxism 
provides the basis for their ideas concerning the social; and structuralism the ideas concerning 
meaning. These two starting points are fused into a single poststructuralist theory. Laclau and 
Mouffe adhere to the poststructuralist critique of structural linguistics, but the Saussurian stable 
structure can function as what we discursively strive to achieve ─ the fixing of the meaning of 
signs. We continuously try to fix the meaning of signs by placing them in particular relations to 
other signs. According to Laclau and Mouffe, this is a futile endeavour because every concrete 
fixation of the meaning of signs is contingent ─ it is possible but not necessary. This is a central 
notion in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, that the contingency of meaning is the opening 
to investigate how some fixations of meaning become so conventionalized that we think of them 
as a ‘natural fact’.  
In the following I will discuss the concept of discourse and narrow down the broad defi-
nition presented in chapter 2.2. In Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory a discourse is seen as a 
fixation of meaning within a particular domain. All signs in a discourse are moments; their 
  
meaning is fixed through their difference from one another. A discourse is formed through the 
partial fixation of meaning around certain nodal points. A nodal point is a privileged sign 
around which the other signs are ordered. The other signs acquire their meaning from their rela-
tionship with the nodal point. A discourse is established as a totality in which each sign is fixed 
as a moment through its relation to other signs. This is done through the exclusion of all other 
meanings that sign could have had. Thus a discourse is a reduction of possibilities. It is an at-
tempt to stop the sliding of signs in relation to one another and hence to create a unified system 
of meaning.  
Laclau and Mouffe use the concept of the field of discursivity for all of the possibilities 
that the discourse excludes. Related to this, Jørgensen and Phillips suggest that it can be fruitful 
to introduce the concept of order of discourse, which they borrow from Fairclough’s critical 
discourse analysis. I agree with Jørgensen and Phillips that it is rewarding to make this analyti-
cal distinction, thus I follow their reformulation of the relationship between discourse, the field 
of discursivity and order of discourse:  
Discourse is the term for the structuring of a particular domain in moments. A discourse is always struc-
tured by the exclusion of other possible meanings and the term for this general exterior is ‘the field of dis-
cursivity’. But now ‘order of discourse’ denotes two or more discourses, each of which strives to establish 
itself in the same domain (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 56). 
Returning to Laclau and Mouffe’s definition of concepts, the field of discursivity denotes all that 
a given discourse excludes. Thus a discourse is always constituted in relation to something ex-
ternal and is in danger of being undermined by other ways of fixing the meaning of signs. This 
is where the concept of elements becomes relevant. Elements are signs with a ‘floating’ charac-
ter; they have multiple, potential meanings and their meaning has not yet been fixed (Howarth 
and Stavrakakis, 2000: 7-9). Discourses therefore strive to transform elements into moments and 
thus establish closure, which can be seen as a temporary stop to fluctuations in the meaning of 
signs. There is a problem, however, that the closure is never definitive, that moments are under 
no circumstances so completely fixed that they cannot become elements again. It can here be 
useful to return to the concept of nodal points, which can be viewed as empty signifiers ─ that is, 
they do not give much meaning in themselves, but have to be positioned with other signs to 
receive meaning. This is done through articulation, which is defined as every practice that es-
tablishes a relation between elements in such a way that the identity of the elements is modified. 
Because discourses strive for but can never fully achieve closure and hegemony, the articulation 
of a discourse can only take place around an empty signifier that functions as a nodal point. 
  
Thus emptiness is viewed as an essential quality of the nodal point, as an important condition of 
possibility for its hegemonic success (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000). 
Laclau and Mouffe introduce the concept of floating signifiers to refer to signs in which 
different discourses try to invest meaning (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 28). Nodal points are 
thus floating signifiers, but Laclau and Mouffe reserve the term nodal point for a sign within a 
particular discourse and the term floating signifiers for struggles between different discourses. 
Finally, all signs referring to society as a totality are floating signifiers; they are invested with a 
different content by different articulations. Laclau and Mouffe call these floating signifiers that 
refer to a totality myth.   
It should be clear by now that discourse in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory can be 
understood as a type of structure in a Saussurian sense – the fixation of meaning of signs in rela-
tion to each other. But as opposed to a Saussurian structure with a permanent closure, Laclau 
and Mouffe advocate the view that a discourse can only obtain a temporary closure, because 
there is always room for struggles over what the structure should look like. Thus, where de 
Saussure was interested in uncovering the structure, Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory is 
concerned with how the structure, in the form of discourse, is constituted and changed (Jørgen-
sen and Phillips, 2002: 29-30)  
Finally, Laclau and Mouffe’s theory has something to add to the critical task of unmask-
ing the taken-for-granted. In their theory of the hegemonic practices of discourse, they concep-
tualize how reality comes to appear as natural and non-contingent. They suggest that discourse, 
through hegemonic closure, fixes the meaning in particular ways and therefore excludes all 
other meaning potentials. Furthermore, the discursive constructions appear as natural and delim-
ited aspects of reality through myths about society and identity. By way of reading the hege-
monic discourses against themselves through the method of deconstruction, Laclau and Mouffe 
strive to show the contingency of the articulations ─ that is, they could have been articulated 
differently (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 186).  
In this sense, for the purpose of my analysis I will further try to read President Bush 
against himself. The aim is to highlight the contingent character of different discourses in the 
‘war on terrorism’ through an ‘analytical redescription’, utilizing concepts from Laclau and 
Mouffe’s theory of discourse as a ‘language of description’ to translate my empirical material. 
Where necessary, I will introduce other theories and discuss specific key concepts in more detail 




4. Discourse Analysis as a Method  
In chapter two I introduced the idea of discourse analysis as a ‘complete package’. This is the 
notion that in discourse analysis, method is part of an integrated epistemological, theoretical and 
methodological whole, and the researcher has to consider this ‘package’ throughout the research 
process. Within the discourse analytical ‘package’, my understanding of method or research 
techniques is the methodological procedure in a more technical sense. I have employed a quali-
tative content analysis of certain documents and will discuss some aspects of this method and 
some characteristics of the chosen documents in more detail. Finally, in this chapter I will dis-
cuss some challenges related to the selection and analysis of the empirical material.  
 
4.1 Qualitative Content Analysis 
The empirical material that has been analysed in this thesis consists of written documents. These 
documents are transcripts of six speeches by US President George W. Bush and an official strat-
egy document of the Bush administration. When analysing documents such as these it is possi-
ble to approach the material either in a qualitative or a quantitative manner. Within these two 
main categories there are a multitude of different methodologies, but generally speaking it is 
possible to talk of quantitative approaches and qualitative approaches.  
According to Grønmo, a general point is that quantitative strategies have their strength in 
their structured approach and their ability to make statistical generalizations. Generally speak-
ing, these approaches take their starting point in the positivistic tradition where the ideal is that 
social sciences can and should use the same criteria for knowledge production as natural sci-
ences. At the base of this view of science is the belief that it is possible to establish an absolute 
distinction between fact and value. In the qualitative approaches, however, these ideas are seen 
as problematic. The critique is that one cannot view the social world in terms of a fact-value 
distinction (Grønmo, 2004: 9-10).  
Narrowing these approaches down to two strategies for analysing documents, the choice 
is between quantitative or qualitative content analysis. Again, there are several distinctive meth-
odologies within the two strategies. Here I want to point out that the choice between undertaking 
qualitative and quantitative research occurs at the level of methods. It does not occur at the level 
of epistemology or theoretical perspective, so it is, for example, possible to start from a con-
structionist epistemology and choose a quantitative method (Crotty, 1998: 14-15). Therefore, 
even though I reject positivism as an ideal, in social science this does not mean that I reject all 
quantitative methods. In this particular project, however, my choice of method was guided by 
my general interest in how a ‘war on terrorism’ was discursively constructed. Accordingly, 
  
qualitative content analysis was chosen because it was seen as a process capable of fulfilling the 
purpose of my research.   
Qualitative content analysis can be viewed as an expanding and cyclic process between 
an overall understanding of the empirical material and the specific textual analysis. I started 
with a research question and selected potentially relevant documents for analysis. In the course 
of analysis, some texts stood out as more relevant than others, and throughout the project there 
was a need to evaluate the relevance of different texts. This process and the final selection of 
seven texts are described in the next section of this chapter. There was also a need to evaluate 
the sources of the texts, the trustworthiness of the texts and the context of the texts (Grønmo, 
2004: 190). At the official White House home Page (http://www.whitehouse.gov/), all speeches 
and documents signed by President Bush are attainable. Hence the question of authenticity was 
not a problem. There is also a satisfactory search option at this home page that aided the process 
of finding relevant texts. In qualitative content analysis, an important point is that the texts are 
not viewed as standing on their own; the texts’ context always matters in the analysis. The 
broader context in this thesis is that these are speeches and a strategy document signed by the 
President of the United States, and they all relate to a constructed ‘war on terrorism’ as a re-
sponse to the attacks on 11 September 2001. The context of the individual texts will be dis-
cussed in the analysis.  
My qualitative data were seven selected texts, and a starting point in the analysis was to 
locate underlying patterns in the material. I started with numerous readings of the texts with the 
aim of categorizing the content. This was done through a process of coding the material. Coding 
is here understood as finding some key words that can describe or characterize larger segments 
of the texts (Grønmo, 2004: 246). This was combined with writing analytical notes to increase 
insight into the empirical patterns. Following Potter and Wetherell, my first stage in coding the 
material was open ─ that is, it was first and foremost the empirical material that determined the 
codes (Potter and Wetherell, 1995: 80-92). The next step in the analysis was to combine the 
transcripts of the texts and the codes that I had developed. During this process it was possible to 
identify emerging themes and connections between them in the material. This process was not as 
open as the previous; it had to be more systematic in the attempt to identify and define the vari-
ous themes’ properties. This process was also cyclic in the sense that in addition to reviewing 
the initial codes, I had to review the transcripts again in search of possible common properties 
within and across the coded material. The themes thus gradually became increasingly coherent. 
In an effort to remain open to unexpected occurrences, the ideal was initially for the themes to 
grow solely out of the empirical material, but eventually the research question also guided the 
  
analysis so as to analyse patterns in the texts in the light of the epistemological and theoretical 
starting point. I use the term ‘ideally’ because in discourse analysis the view is that themes can-
not just appear out of the material. This is because of the inherent perspectivism in the construc-
tionist epistemology, thus the specific themes became visible to me because I read the texts 
through my lens, through my perspective. The challenges concerning this set of problems will 
be discussed further in 4.4.  
At this point in the analysis, I had located four major themes in the texts. When I identi-
fied each theme, a note was made as to which text it was identified in, on which page and on 
which line(s). In this thesis all of the empirical material ─ the seven texts ─ are included as an 
appendix and the references made in the analytical chapters refer to which text, page and line the 
quote stems. Thus, for example, the reference (4: 8:12-9: 4) indicate that the quote is from text 
four, page eight, line twelve, until page nine, line four.    
After organizing the relevant raw material from the data in a coherent, conceptual and 
manageable form, it was possible to move on to presenting the analysis’s results. There is ten-
sion in this process, since the more organized the relevant raw material becomes, the further the 
move is from the individual transcripts that generated the themes (Smith, 1995: 22). Also, the 
method presented here might seem mechanical, but what will determine the value of the analysis 
at the end is the quality of the interpretive work undertaken by the investigator. So it is essential 
to be systematic, but it is also important to be analytical and creative (Smith, 1995). 
 
4.2 Texts as Monuments 
Before I define my understanding of what a monument text is, I will clarify my understanding of 
the concept text. Neumann advocates the view that everything can be studied as text, as phe-
nomena bound together by a code. This does not imply that everything is text; rather it means 
that everything can be read as text (Neumann, 2001: 23). Roland Barthes’ analysis of various 
non-discursive artefacts from popular culture can work as an example here (Gregory, 1989: vii). 
Barthes was interested in why artefacts such as photographs, the sport of wrestling and Garbo’s 
face were meaningful to so many people. What Barthes did was that he read these objects, ar-
ticulating in words what everyone knew they meant but knew without the object having uttered 
anything in words. Barthes showed through this how things get their meaning by being part of a 
culture and how meaning can precede the thing.  
So in order to see the world as a text, the issue of meaning should be tackled in a new 
manner. If the objects described above can be said to have meaning independently of the person 
who took the photograph or what the wrestling match meant to the wrestler, then written things 
  
too may in some way have meanings independently of the author, hence the expression ‘the 
death of the author’ (Neumann, 2001: 40). Another point in this context is Derrida’s notion of 
‘there is nothing outside of the text’ (quoted in Burr, 2003: 67). This is based on the view that 
language is situated between the world and people in the world and therefore nothing can exist 
outside of the text. My view of text is that everything can be read as text, and that by loosening 
the text from the author, authority is relocated in the culture.  
Returning to the question of how I selected the texts for analysis, I have drawn on the 
‘monument’ concept as, for example, presented in Neumann (2001: 51-52). A text can be con-
sidered a ‘monument’ if it is seen as sufficiently important and central. The text gets its central-
ity and importance from its relation to other texts, by being quoted and/or referred to by a con-
siderable number of other texts. After the decision to make the ‘war on terrorism’ my research 
focus, I discovered an enormous amount of literature on the subject, both scientific and journal-
istic. Following an initial study of some of this literature, I noticed that some speeches by Presi-
dent Bush stood out – that is, they were quoted and referred to over and over again in a broad 
spectre of literature produced after 11 September. As my research question became more devel-
oped, with an interest in how the ‘war on terrorism’ was discursively constructed as a response 
to terrorism by President Bush, some texts stood out even more. I finally selected seven texts as 
the empirical material for the analysis, because they deal with the terrorist attack on 11 Septem-
ber 2001 and the succeeding construction of a ‘war on terrorism’ as the appropriate response. As 
explained earlier, six are speeches by President Bush and the last text is the official National 
Security Strategy of the United States of America, published in September 2002. Time and space 
restricted the amount of material to be included in the analysis. There is an immense amount of 
speeches by President Bush, and also numerous official documents signed by his administration. 
As will become apparent, the seven texts have a timeframe of approximately one year, from 
September 2001 until September 2002. I will argue that the starting point of 11 September 2001 
is given by the overall theme of the thesis ─ the construction of a ‘war on terrorism’ as the re-
sponse to the terrorist attacks. The in-between texts, I will assert, are all in their own way cen-
tral, in the sense that they give insight into the process of waging war. The last text, the National 
Security Strategy, can be seen as the first manifestation of action-oriented guidelines for the 
future foreign policy of the United States.  
A critical point is whether the selected texts can be viewed as ‘monuments’. I will argue 
that they can be viewed in this way, on the grounds of the above-mentioned criteria of centrality 
and importance. The most important events of foreign policy, not only on the US domestic stage 
but the whole world shortly after 11 September 2001, are dominated by expressions from these 
  
speeches. The phrase ‘war on terrorism’ (Bush, 2001a) or ‘freedom at war with fear’ (Bush, 
2001b) or ‘axis of evil’ (Bush, 2002a) all first occurred in one of these speeches. The wide-held 
view that Bush is president of today’s only superpower and to a large extent has the means to 
back up his claims on, for example, ‘either you are with us or you are with the terrorists’ (Bush, 
2001b) gives these texts a special importance. In the next section each text will be presented.  
 
4.3 The Selected Empirical Material 
Chronologically, the first text to be analysed in this thesis is the prime-time speech delivered by 
President Bush on 11 September. I see this text as important because from the very beginning 
Bush made a sharp distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Bush, 2001a). As will become apparent 
in chapter 5, I see the oppositional structuring of ‘us’ and ‘them’ as a crucial element in the con-
struction of ‘the war on terrorism’. In addition, President Bush made it clear from the start that 
this was a conflict between good and evil and freedom and fear (Bush, 2001a):   
Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature. And we responded with the best of America 
[…] Yet, we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world. (1: 1: 18-2: 21). 
Only hours after the attacks on 11 September, President Bush set the stage for ‘the war on ter-
rorism’. As remarked by Silberstein, this was predicted as having long-lasting consequences:  
In his first formal speech of the day, President Bush has set into motion the themes that will accompany US 
policy and actions for the foreseeable future: Evil, Terror and the War on Terrorism (Silberstein, 2002: 10).  
Another important point that was communicated from the very beginning was that the enemy 
were not only the actual perpetrators, the terrorists behind the attacks, but rather the enemy were 
also anyone who harboured them (Bush, 2001a):  
We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them    
( 1: 2: 7-8). 
Making this link, which was elaborated upon in later texts, was the logic that made war the ap-
propriate response to terrorism and that later legitimized the response of going to war in Af-
ghanistan. 
Text 2 is The Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People on 20 
September 2001 (Bush, 2001b). In this speech President Bush gave a worldwide ultimatum: that 
‘everyone’ had to choose on which side they wanted to be ─ either the side of the United States 
or the side of the terrorists. This was a development of the argument in the first text (Bush, 
2001a) where ‘we’ make no distinction between the terrorists and those who harbour them. 
Now, nine days later, President Bush was forcing the rest of the world to make a choice: either 
you are with ‘us’ and if not you are by ‘our’ definition with ‘them’. Daalder and Lindsay com-
ment on this: 
  
The need to force countries to choose sides, even if only rhetorically, was essential (Daalder and Lindsay, 
2003: 86). 
Forcing this oppositional structure on the rest of the world was important in the construction of a 
‘war on terrorism’ because it made it impossible not to choose sides. In the world of President 
Bush there was no middle ground, no room for compromise. From then on it was either you are 
with ‘us’ or you are with ‘them’. 
On 7 October 2001 Bush announced the bombing of Afghanistan. According to President 
Bush, this was not an act of war but a ‘military action’ that would rid Afghanistan of the brutal 
Taliban regime, which by not meeting the demands made by the United States to hand over the 
leaders of the al Qaeda network, had brought this on themselves (Bush, 2001c): 
None of these demands were met. And now the Taliban will pay a price (3: 1:17-18). 
In this third text, again, the rest of the world was put on notice. President Bush made it clear that 
this ‘military action’ was only the beginning of a broader conflict where everyone still had to 
choose sides (Bush, 2001c):  
Today we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle is broader. Every nation has a choice to make. In this con-
flict, there is no neutral ground (3: 2:8-9). 
On 10 November 2001, approximately two months after the terrorist attacks in New York and 
Washington and approximately one month after initiating the war in Afghanistan, President 
Bush addressed the United Nations General Assembly. Of the selected empirical material, this 
text had the widest audience as it included all of the nations represented in the UN. At the be-
ginning of his speech President Bush expressed that the civilized nations in the UN are against 
terror and lawless violence, also stating that there are uncivilized nations represented in the 
General Assembly (Bush, 2001d). In this text President Bush presented his view of a world in a 
time of terror. He stated that the ‘war on terrorism’ would not end with the war in Afghanistan, 
and he sent a strong message about the future of regimes that he defined as the uncivilized that 
support and harbour terrorists (Bush, 2001d):   
And some governments, while pledging to uphold the principles of the U.N., have cast their lot with the ter-
rorists. They support them and harbor them, and they will find that their welcome guests are parasites that 
will weaken them, and eventually consume them. For every regime that sponsors terror, there is a price to 
be paid. And it will be paid. The allies of terror are equally guilty of murder and equally accountable to jus-
tice (4: 4: 4-8). 
The fifth text is the State of the Union speech delivered on 29 January 2002 (Bush, 2002a), 
where President Bush:  
[…] famously proclaimed North Korea, Iran and Iraq to be an ‘axis of evil’, and in contrast, he called the 
United States ‘a moral nation’ (Singer, 2004: 1).  
  
This announcement of the existence of an ‘axis of evil’ that threatens the civilized world is a 
discursively relevant feature that I will pursue further in chapter 5.3 of my analysis. Text 5 is 
also important because it is where President Bush elaborates on some of the implications of the 
waged ‘war on terrorism’. A prominent feature was the definition of what would constitute an 
imminent threat to the security of the United States, something to which Daalder and Lindsay 
also draw attention:  
The full extent of Bush’s war on terror became apparent when he delivered his first State of the Union ad-
dress [...] Then, using the most dire language heard in any presidential speech since John F. Kennedy’s first 
State of the Union address four decades earlier, Bush declared that the United States could no longer afford 
to sit and wait until America was struck again (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003: 120). 
At first glance Text 6 might not give the impression of being considered a ‘monument’, since it 
is an address to the graduation class of West Point Military Academy and not to a broader audi-
ence. Still, this text can be viewed as both central and important because this is where President 
Bush first presents the major shift in US foreign policy from deterrence and containment to pre-
emption (Melby, 2004: 148). This new feature has been labelled as the ‘Bush Doctrine’: 
In four succinct paragraphs, he spelled out a new view of when it is justifiable to take military action – a 
view that has come to be known as the ‘Bush Doctrine’ (Singer 2004: 178-179).  
At the same time, Text 6 was the forerunner to the final text: The National Security Strategy of 
the United States of America (Bush, 2002c). This last text of my empirical material is where the 
new foreign policy principles became the official strategy of the United States.  The ideas be-
hind the policy were by no means new, but the events of 11 September 2001 worked as a cata-
lyst for these views and made it possible for them to become the official policy (Melby, 2004: 
148, and Gregory, 2004: 51). This text is considered both to be the official strategy of the com-
plete administration and the most detailed document concerning the ‘war on terrorism’ until that 
date. As Singer points out: 
Bush’s words at West Point were carefully chosen. They represented the considered conclusions, not only 
of the president, but of his entire national security team. That became evident with the release of The Na-
tional Security Strategy of the United States of America (Singer, 2004: 180).  
The same conclusion is also drawn by Daalder and Lindsay: 
The fullest elaboration of Bush’s strategy for defeating the terrifying combination of terrorism, tyrants, and 
technologies of mass destruction came in the National Security Strategy […] (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003: 
122).   
In this section I have presented the seven texts that embody my empirical material. I have aimed 
to show how each text can be seen as important and central and thus can be viewed as a monu-
ment text. The last section of this chapter will discuss challenges related to the inherent perspec-
  
tivism in discourse analysis and challenges concerning validity in the qualitative content analy-
sis and in the overall research project. 
 
4.4 Challenges related to the Selection and Analysis of the Empirical Material 
In this project, the challenges posed by perspectivism concern both the process of selecting the 
empirical material and its analysis. First, the challenge to determine which texts to analyse re-
lates to how the researcher’s perspective influences this selection. The seven texts in my empiri-
cal material were selected because in my opinion they are central and important and thus create 
a gravitation centre for discourses – that is, they are viewed as monuments. Second, the notion 
of perspectivism also has consequences for the analytical process, where I recognize that the 
knowledge that I produce is obtained from my particular perspective and is context bound and 
contingent. There is, however, also an up-side in recognizing this, because highlighting that ‘I 
come from somewhere’ can aid in demystifying that President Bush also ‘comes from some-
where’. Therefore, what can seem a natural, unproblematic and universal understanding of the 
world is actually a process of transforming meanings from cultural to natural. Third, the chal-
lenge that perspectivism brings with it is the problem of relativism, which is related to the larger 
epistemological discussion of the character and status of knowledge that I discussed in chapter 
two and particularly in 2.4. Related to this is also the concept of validity ─ that is, the question 
of what standards my research must meet in order to count as qualified academic research (Jør-
gensen and Phillips, 2002: 171). One way of determining the academic standard of the research 
can thus be to evaluate the validity of the study, because according to Jørgensen and Phillips, 
relativism does not in itself reduce the academic value. Because even though discourse analysis 
rejects objectivism’s scientific demands for reliability and validity, it does not mean that all 
demands for validity are dismissed (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 117). There are two levels to 
consider here: the validity of the overall research project and the validity of the empirical mate-
rial’s content analysis.  
In determining the validity of a qualitative content analysis, one place to start is by focus-
ing on the coherence of the analysis and the fruitfulness of the analysis (Grønmo, 2004: ch 10 
and 12). Coherence in the analysis relates to the point that analytical claims should form a co-
herent discourse. In evaluating the fruitfulness of the analysis, the focus is on the explanatory 
potential of the analytical framework, including its capability to provide new explanations. The 
criteria of coherence and fruitfulness are, however, not uncontested.4 In this project I will there-
fore follow Jørgensen and Phillips in their view that the most important criterion is to explicate 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 171-174. 
  
and follow the criteria of validity to which I adhere (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 173). Follow-
ing this notion, and as mentioned earlier in this chapter, qualitative content analysis is here seen 
as a circular process between the specific textual analysis and an overall understanding of the 
empirical material. A question related to the validity of the text analysis thus becomes: when to 
consider it as completed, when can/should the analyst break the interpretive circle and stop the 
analysis?  
According to Jørgensen and Phillips, there is no final answer to this question. They do, 
however, make some suggestions. First, the analysis should be solid ─ that is, it should ideally 
be based on more that one textual feature. Second, the analysis should be comprehensive ─ that 
is, the questions posed to the text should be answered fully and textual features that conflict with 
the analysis should be accounted for. Third, the analysis should be transparent ─ that is, the 
analysis should be presented in a transparent way. The reader of the analysis should be allowed 
as far as possible to ‘test’ the claims made (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002).  
Finally, in this chapter I want to indicate some notions related to the overall validity of 
this research project. One aspect in this respect is the inner consistency of the research – that is, 
do the epistemological premises, the theoretical claims and the methodology employed form a 
‘complete package’ as presented at the beginning of this chapter? As presented in chapter two, 
my view of the status of scientific knowledge is as a truth that can be discussed. My aim with 
this project is to say something about a discursive construction of a ‘war on terrorism’, and I 
recognize that in achieving this aim it is important to conduct the research in a particular way 
and according to particular rules.  
Throughout this project I have aimed to follow the general principle that the research 
steps should be as transparent as possible and that the argumentation is consistent. More specifi-
cally, I have aimed for the rules set by my choice of ‘language of redescription’ in chapter three 
to form a coherent system. Following Jørgensen and Phillips, theoretical and methodological 
consistency is in this way a research constraint – that is, as a researcher I understand the world 
in a particular way rather than in other possible ways. However, this necessary constraint is also 
productive. Because, as I discussed in chapter three, the use of a specific theory in the produc-
tion and analysis of the empirical material enables me to distance myself from my everyday 
understanding of the material, which in turn is vital to constructionist research (Jørgensen and 
Phillips, 2002: 207). It is my hope that in these first four chapters I have defined sufficiently the 
standards that this research aims to meet and that they function as an explicit foundation for the 
knowledge to be produced in the chapters to follow.  
 
  
5. Analysing the Construction of a War 
More than a rational calculation of interests takes us to war. People go to war because of how they see, 
perceive, picture, imagine and speak of others; that is, how they construct the difference of others as well 
as the sameness of themselves through representations (Der Derian, 2002: 110). 
 
My aim is to explore how President Bush and his administration discursively constructed the 
‘war on terrorism’ as a response to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. As will become 
apparent, I see the discursive buttressing of a simplistic dualism between ‘us’ and ‘them’ as the 
key component in the construction of the war. I will argue that this buttressing is an attempt to 
unite by using the logic of confrontation and that this heightens the level of conflict.    
In any type of community, small or large, there exist different ways of representing the 
world. In the United States, as in most countries, one can find examples of multiculturalism and 
tolerance, as well as racism and xenophobia. I will argue that it is by tapping into familiar dis-
courses that the Bush administration constructed the ‘war on terrorism’ as part of a common-
sense strategy for foreign policy. An important process is the move from cultural to natural. It 
could be argued, for example, that to construct an intolerant evil ‘them’, one would have to tap 
into a xenophobic strain in the audience. Furthermore, it can be postulated that the construction 
of ‘them’ as evil is a cultural construction based on naturalization of a religious dualism of the 
struggle between good and evil. The construction of ‘us’ as good is dependent on ‘them’ being 
evil. Thus in the process of constructing ‘them’, the ‘us’ is also constructed on the basis of ‘our’ 
difference from ‘them’.  In the course of reading, identifying, coding and categorizing primary 
patterns in the empirical material, I identified four discourses that I view as vital in the construc-
tion of the ‘war on terrorism’. In accordance with my epistemological and methodological start-
ing point of constructionism, it is important to emphasize that these discourses are my construc-
tions and that they are therefore not to be regarded as ontological entities.  
In chapter 5.1 to 5.4 I will present four discourses that I have delineated from my empiri-
cal material. I will start in chapter section 5.1 with an outline of how a distinction between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ functions as the key division in discursively constructing the ‘war on terrorism’. I 
therefore view the ‘us-them’ discourse as a superior category and the other three discourses as 
sub-discourses ─ that is, the sub-discourses acquire their meaning from being qualities that are 
ascribed to either ‘us’ or ‘them’. The ‘us-them’ discourse fixes the meaning of, for example, 
good and evil as something intrinsic in ‘us’ and ‘them’ ─ ‘we’ are good and ‘they’ are evil. In 
order to create a unity of meaning, this process thus excludes other possible meanings that good 
and evil have or had in other discourses.  
  
All four discourses are visible from the beginning of the timeframe covered by my empirical 
material. After introducing in 5.1 the key oppositional categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’, in 5.2 I will 
analyse the first sub-discourse: the representation of ‘us’ as freedom and ‘them’ as fear. In 5.3 I 
will focus on representations of good and evil in my empirical material. Finally, in 5.4 I will 
explore how the representations of ‘us’ as civilization and ‘them’ as barbarism are utilized by 
President Bush and his administration in the discursive construction of the ‘war on terrorism’. I 
will show that there is a semantic development within each of the four discourses, resulting in 
my view that the construction of the ‘war on terrorism’ is composed of parallel processes. I will 
discuss the specifics of these developments in each chapter section. 
 
5.1 The Relational Logic of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ 
In general, the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is an essential mechanism that we utilize in 
identifying who we are. The identity of ‘us’ is dependent on a ‘them’ that is both different and 
outside of ‘us’. As Buzan argues, for example, if we accept this interdependence then we also 
have to accept that there can never be a worldwide universal sense of community, because po-
litical communities are built on oppositions between ‘us’ and ‘them’. There can thus never be a 
‘world democracy’ including everyone, providing full freedom and equality (Buzan, 2004: 17). 
In my opinion, what is important is that even though there will always be an ‘us’ and a ‘them’, it 
is possible and also paramount that an ideal to strive for is the most possible equality in the 
world. Moreover, this interdependence does not have to be antagonistic. ‘Them’ being different 
from ‘us’ is not necessarily something to be feared. As Connolly points out, the identities of ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ are bound together. It is not possible to reconstitute the relation to the second with-
out confounding the experience of the first (Connolly, 1989: 329). When it comes to analysing 
the division between ‘us’ and ‘them’ in the construction of the ‘war on terrorism’, an important 
notion is that any given story about ‘them’ also reveals a story about ‘us’. Jørgensen and Phillips 
make an important point when recognizing that analysis of ‘them’ is always hand in hand with 
the creation of ‘us’. Furthermore, analysis of ‘them’ can also disclose what a given discourse 
about ‘us’ excludes, and what social consequences this exclusion has (Jørgensen and Phillips, 
2002: 50-51). Even though my focus is on the construction of an external ‘them’ (that is, ‘them’ 
outside of the United States), it is worth noting, as Connolly does, that if one views the world 
through dichotomies such as ‘us’ and ‘them’, this also has consequences for how one views 
difference within the ‘us’. Because if you deny the enigma of external otherness and think of it 
as innocent, evil, barbaric, etc., then one also treats difference within as an otherness to be natu-
ralized, converted or defeated (Connolly, 1989: 326). Thus one focus in this thesis is on how 
  
contemporary US foreign policy defines and copes with otherness. In line with the introductory 
quote from Der Derian, the central question then becomes: how do we (here the United States) 
speak, perceive, imagine and act in our relation to ‘them’? (Der Derian, 2002: 110).  
 
5.1.1. It’s ‘Us’ Against ‘Them’ 
Huntington provides one possible answer to the above question when he states that we know 
who we are only when we know who we are not, and then he adds that often we only know who 
we are when we know who we are against (Huntington, 2002: 21). This way of making sense 
constructs an antagonistic worldview of friends and enemies. Huntington’s logic takes for 
granted that the identity of ‘us’ is dependent on a fear of ‘them’. Thus his argument begins with 
a premise of fear, and if one questions that premise then his argument loses its logic. In his arti-
cle and the later book5 regarding the alleged ‘clashes of civilizations’, Huntington claims that 
culture will become the dominant axis of conflict in the twenty-first century, and that civiliza-
tions will be the primary cultural groupings. He introduces three sets of clashes: first, ‘the clash 
of civilizations’, which in the end boils down to the dualism of the ‘West versus the Rest’ 
(Huntington, 2002: 33); second is what he calls ‘the real clash’, which involves the ‘West versus 
the Post-West’, where Huntington is concerned with the problem of multiculturalism and the 
focus on ‘group’ (ethnical, racial, cultural, etc.) identities over national identity (Huntington, 
2002: 307); finally, he describes ‘[…] the global “real clash” between Civilization and barba-
rism […]’ (Huntington, 2002: 321). The idea of this last ‘clash’ will be discussed further in 
chapter section 5.4 where I analyse this ‘clash’ as it is reflected in my empirical material. What 
concerns me in Huntington’s analysis is the way that the question of ‘who we are’ and ‘who 
they are’ is answered, and also the claim of culture/religion being the ‘new’ fault line between 
‘us’ and ‘them’. Conflicts along the axis of culture and identity are zero-sum conflicts (Salter, 
2002: 3). This implies that there are no in-betweens, no room for compromise. One is either part 
of ‘us’ on the inside or belongs to ‘them’ and hence is placed on the outside. 
The reason for this brief introduction of Huntington’s analysis is that even though the 
Bush administration has declared that the ‘war on terrorism’ is not a clash between civiliza-
tions,6 both Huntington and the Bush administration start from worldviews with an antagonistic 
relationship between ‘us’ and ‘them’. As pointed out by Edwards and Martin, initial reactions to 
the terrorist attacks outside the United States were of sympathy and concern, but this attitude 
                                                 
5 A first draft of the argument was first presented in Samuel Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ in Foreign 
Affairs 72/2 (1993). Gregory points out that Huntington’s thesis had its origin from Bernard Lewis (Gregory, 
2004: 56). I will argue below that Lewis can be seen as having an influence on the Bush administration’s view 
on Islam.   
6 See Bush, 2002c, 7: 38: 6-7. 
  
proved difficult to sustain as the US quickly opted for an unsubtle ‘us-them’ scenario, which in 
turn led to the simplistic mantra of ‘with-us-or-with-the-terrorists’ (Edwards and Martin, 2004: 
149). The notion of ‘either or’ as the only two options is clearly reflected in my empirical mate-
rial. It is probably most evident in the following quote from President Bush’s speech on 20 Sep-
tember 2001, which was also quoted in my introduction (Bush, 2001b):   
Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the 
terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded 
by the United States as a hostile regime (2: 5:16-19). 
This is a powerful and absolutist statement in several ways. First, it is directed to every single 
nation in the world. Second, it reveals an attitude of power: when something disastrous happens 
to the United States, the rest of the world is expected actively to take a stand. Finally, there is a 
powerful and aggressive warning in this statement: any nation that does not follow orders and 
choose ‘us’, will by definition be regarded as a ‘hostile regime’ by the US. 
Even if not communicated in the same spellbinding manner, the warning to choose ‘us’ 
or ‘them’ is repeated in my material:    
Every nation has a choice to make. In this conflict, there is no neutral ground (3: 2: 8-9). 
Any government that rejects this principle, trying to pick and choose its terrorist friends, will know the 
consequences (4: 6: 5-6). 
But some governments will be timid in the face of terror. And make no mistake about it: If they do not act, 
America will (5: 4: 1-2). 
There can be no neutrality between justice and cruelty, between the innocent and the guilty. We are in a 
conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by its name (6: 5: 19-21). 
In these quotes one can observe the repetition of this as a question for every nation in the world. 
Everyone has to choose between the only two options ─ ‘us’ or ‘them’ ─ there can be no com-
promise, ‘no neutral ground’. The powerful warning to nations that if they do not choose ‘us’ 
they ‘will know the consequences’ is also repeated. In the last quote President Bush not only 
represents the situation as a choice between ‘us’ and ‘them’; it is also a choice between ‘justice’ 
and ‘cruelty’, ‘innocent’ and ‘guilty’, ‘good’ and ‘evil’. Hence there is a development where 
positive values are ascribed to ‘us’ and negative values are attributed to ‘them’.  
In addition to the explicit division between ‘us’ and ‘them’, there are two more distinc-
tions in the empirical material that I regard as crucial for the construction of the ‘war on terror-
ism’. First is the notion that the attacks on 11 September 2001 were not criminal acts, but were 
acts of war (Bush, 2001b):  
On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country (2: 2: 16). 
  
This quote is from the speech on 20 September 2001, and by declaring the terrorist attacks acts 
of war at such an early stage, President Bush prepared the world for a warlike response from the 
US. In relation to the Bush administration interpreting the attacks as acts of war and thus declar-
ing a ‘war on terrorism’, philosopher Jürgen Habermas makes an interesting argument. He con-
siders the decision to call for a ‘war on terrorism’ as a serious mistake on two grounds: first, by 
recognizing the attacks as acts of war, President Bush elevates the criminals behind the attacks 
to the status of war enemies; second, pragmatically one cannot lead a war against a ‘network’ 
(for al Qaeda is seen as a terrorist network) if the term ‘war’ is to retain any definite meaning 
(Borradori, 2003: 34-35). 
The second crucial distinction was that state governments that harboured, supported or 
aided terrorists in any way would be regarded as equally guilty as the actual perpetrators:   
We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them 
(1: 2: 7-8). 
We make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them (7: 8: 
17-18). 
As the quotes reflect, this decision was made from the very beginning and it is also repeated in 
the last text of my material, the National Security Strategy from September 2002 (Bush, 2002c). 
It was precisely this distinction that opened up the possibility of going to war in Afghanistan, 
since the Taliban were harbouring al Qaeda.  
In the next two sections I will first analyse the construction of ‘us’ and second I will turn 
to ‘them’. As stated above, all of the analytical chapters can be viewed as distinctive ways of 
constructing ‘us’ and ‘them’. Thus the aim of this chapter is not to exhaust the categories, but to 
introduce some key characteristics of the oppositional structuring of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in the con-
struction of the ‘war on terrorism’.  
 
5.1.2 Differentiating ‘Us’: Constructing a National ‘Us’ with Friends, Allies and Partners 
In my empirical material the ‘us’ category is first and foremost the national identity of the US. 
This is the core that is reinforced throughout my empirical material. The process of constructing 
a shared national identity on the basis of ‘our’ difference from ‘them’ becomes apparent in Text 
1 of my empirical material: President Bush’s prime-time speech on 11 September 2001 (Bush, 
2001a).  In this speech President Bush (re)constructs the national identity of the American peo-
ple and the American nation based on ‘our’ difference from ‘them’: 
A great people has been moved to defend a great nation. Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our 
biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America. These acts shattered steel, but they 
cannot dent the steel of American resolve.[…] America and our friends and allies join with all those who 
  
want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism.[…] This is a 
day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and peace. America has 
stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time. None of us will ever forget this day. Yet, we go 
forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world (1: 1: 13 - 2: 21).  
As I indicated in chapter 3, I utilize some key concepts from Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse 
theory. In analysing how President Bush (re)constructs the US identity in the context of a ‘war 
against terrorism’, it can be fruitful to apply Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of chains of equiva-
lence. As I will show below, chains of equivalence can be seen as the linking together of signifi-
ers and as a result establishing the identity of a nodal point relationally (Jørgensen and Phillips, 
2002: 42-43). The identity of a certain nodal point is established in the quote above: the nodal 
point of ‘America’. It is established through its relation to other moments in a positive chain of 
equivalence. President Bush represents ‘us’ (America) as a ‘great people’ and a ‘great nation’ 
and links ‘us’ to the moments: ‘peace’, ‘security’, ‘justice’, ‘freedom’ and ‘goodness’. Hence, 
under normal circumstances ‘we’ are peaceful and non-aggressive, but when ‘we’ are faced with 
terrorism as an enemy ‘we’ possess an ultimate determination, a determination as strong as 
‘steel’, a resolve that ‘we’ have shown ‘before’. In Laclau and Mouffe’s terms, ‘America’ can 
here be seen as a floating signifier ─ that is, a signifier that appears with different meanings 
within different discourses. While President Bush strives to fill ‘America’ with positive meaning 
by relating it to moments such as ‘peace’, ‘security’ and ‘justice’, etc., this peaceful, secure and 
just depiction is not necessarily uncontested. Others might invest a different meaning in the sign 
‘America’.  
Because ‘America’ refers to a society as a totality, it is also a myth in Laclau and 
Mouffe’s terms. The constant recreation of this myth is visible throughout my empirical mate-
rial. The identity of the national ‘us’ (America) is constructed in both a particular and a univer-
sal manner, as one can see in these quotes from Texts 2 (Bush, 2001b), 3 (Bush, 2001c) and 5 
(Bush, 2002a):  
We have seen it [the state of the Union] in the courage of passengers, who rushed terrorists to save others 
on the ground ─ passengers like an exceptional man named Todd Beamer. And would you please help me 
to welcome his wife, Lisa Beamer, here tonight? (2: 1: 9-11).  
I recently received a touching letter that says a lot about the state of America in these difficult times ─ a 
letter from a 4th-grade girl, with a father in the military: ‘As much as I don’t want my Dad to fight’ she 
wrote, ‘I’m willing to give him to you’. This is a precious gift, the greatest she could give. This young girl 
knows what America is all about. Since September 11, an entire generation of young Americans has gained 
new understanding of the value of freedom, and its cost in duty and in sacrifice (3: 3: 12-17). 
Last month, at the grave of her husband, Michael, a CIA officer and Marine who died in Mazar-i-Sharif, 
Shannon Spann said these words of farewell: ‘Semper Fi, my love’. Shannon is with us tonight. Shannon, I 
  
assure you and all who have lost a loved one that our cause is just, and our country will never forget the 
debt we owe Michael and all who gave their lives for freedom (5: 2: 13-17). 
In the first quote above, two individuals, Todd and Lisa Beamer, are brought forward by Presi-
dent Bush as symbols of individuals making up the identity of ‘us’. Todd Beamer was an ‘ex-
ceptional man’, who when faced with ‘them’, the ‘terrorists’, sacrificed himself to ‘save oth-
ers’. Thus the state of the Union, the state of the national identity of the United States, is repre-
sented as one of ‘courage’ and exceptional sacrifice.  
The second quote is from President Bush’s speech declaring the commencement of Op-
eration Enduring Freedom, which was initiated against Afghanistan on 7 October 2001 (Bush, 
2001c). I contend that President Bush presents the letter from the little girl as a letter to the na-
tion. The context is the nation going to war and a little girl understanding ‘what America is all 
about’. Thus when even a little girl understands this simple truth, how could anybody who 
wants to be included in this discursively constructed ‘we’ not also be able to understand? 
‘America’ is represented literally to be all about the universal value of ‘freedom’. ‘America’ 
represents the ‘value of freedom’ and it is for this value that ‘we’ are going to war. ‘We’ have a 
‘duty’ to make the ultimate ‘sacrifice’ for this value. The little girl with her father in the military 
understands what ‘we’ are all about, and she is ‘willing to give him to you’. She is willing to 
sacrifice her father for the ‘freedom’ of the nation. While President Bush in the first quote con-
structed the identity of ‘us’ in a time of crisis, in the second quote he was aiming at the necessity 
for this ‘us’ to make individual sacrifices for the nation and initiate a war.  
In the third quote the nation has experienced its first casualties in the ‘war against terror-
ism’. ‘Michael’ had died in battle and President Bush, representing the nation, is comforting his 
wife Shannon that Michael and others sharing his destiny ‘gave their life for freedom’. With 
these quotes President Bush continuously constructs the national identity of ‘us’. Individual US 
citizens are brought forward as examples of the condition of the nation that is as ‘strong’ as 
‘steel’, and ‘we’ also represent the universal value of ‘freedom’. Freedom is constructed to be 
what ‘America is all about’, and hence ‘we’ go to war in the name of ‘freedom’. 
The core of all of the arguments in my empirical material is a national ‘us’ that is con-
stantly reinforced. The ‘us’ in varying degree is extended to include friends, allies and partners 
in ‘the war on terrorism’. In Text 3, announcing the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom, 
it is made clear who ‘our’ friends are (Bush, 2001c): 
We are joined in this operation by our staunch friend, Great Britain. Other close friends, including Canada, 
Australia, Germany and France, have pledged forces as the operation unfolds. More than 40 countries in the 
Middle East, Africa, Europe and across Asia have granted air transit or landing rights. Many more have 
shared intelligence. We are supported by the collective will of the world (3: 1: 10-14). 
  
President Bush is not only constructing different versions of ‘us’ in this quote; he is also discur-
sively constructing a hierarchy within the ‘us’. First the US ‘us’, then ‘our’ closest friend Great 
Britain, then further other close friends are listed by name, followed by the more diffuse 40 
countries, and finally the US is supported by a joint ‘will of the world’. The construction of 
partners in the ‘war on terrorism’ is also essential, even if partners are discursively placed at the 
bottom of the hierarchy. Russia and China are mentioned in this relation in three of the seven 
texts.7 The quote below is from Text 6, the speech at West Point (Bush, 2002b):  
I’ve just returned from a new Russia, now a country reaching toward democracy, and our partner in the war 
against terror. Even in China, leaders are discovering that economic freedom is the only lasting source of 
national wealth. In time, they will find that social and political freedom is the only true source of national 
greatness (6: 6: 12-16). 
Russia is named here as a ‘partner’ in the ‘war on terrorism’, while it can be argued that China 
is not considered close enough to be regarded as a partner. Still, China’s move in what is con-
sidered the right direction is regarded as important. The description of China can be interpreted 
in several ways. It could be argued that for China to acquire ‘national greatness’ they have to 
become more like ‘us’, or rather like the US. This interpretation depends, of course, on the no-
tion that China today does not have any ‘national greatness’, a notion probably not shared by 
most Chinese. There are also two interpretations concerning how China could be considered ‘a 
partner’ to be included in the ‘us’. To reach ‘partner status’ China either has to become more 
democratic or become more obvious in its support of the US ‘war on terrorism’ ─ or perhaps 
both.  
As will become apparent, the composition of ‘us’ changes during the one-year period 
covered by the empirical material. The next section will argue that since the ‘us’ and ‘them’ are 
related, when one category discursively changes so does the other. 
 
5.1.3 Specifying ‘Them’ in the Question ‘Why do They Hate Us?’  
The previous section argued that especially in the first texts of my empirical material, President 
Bush constructed an ‘us’ that was a mix of a particular and a universal national US identity, and 
a hierarchical common identity consisting of an alliance of friends, allies and partners. China 
was used as an example of an outsider that can, if it adjusts, be on its way into the alliance.  
This section focuses on President Bush’s construction of ‘them’. Because the overall aim is to 
investigate different representations of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in the context of constructing a ‘war on 
terrorism’, I will here narrow down my focus to the Bush administration’s answer to the ques-
                                                 
7 The importance of China and Russia as partners in the ‘war on terrorism’ is in addition to be found in Bush, 
2002a (5: 10: 14-18) and Bush, 2002c (7: 29: 4- 31; 26). 
  
tion ‘Why do they hate us’. The question revolves around why ‘they’ hate ‘us’ so intensely that 
‘they’ were willing to perform such a terrorist attack as ‘they’ did on 11 September 2001. The 
answer changes during the one-year timeframe of my material. More specifically, I will trace the 
answers given where ‘they’ are represented as Muslims, and thus also the answers to why in 
general Muslims would have reason to hate the United States.  
In relation to the question and the internal battle in the Bush administration concerning 
official policies in the immediate aftermath of 11 September, the account by former speech-
writer for President Bush David Frum is of interest (Frum, 2003). He states that even though 
President Bush’s popularity was extremely high with the general public in the first two months 
after 11 September, it was falling among the conservative elite in Washington. They did not like 
Secretary of State Colin Powell’s attempt to recruit Syria and Iran into the antiterrorism coali-
tion, they were critical to the idea of postponing the war in Afghanistan until after Ramadan, and 
most of all they did not like President Bush praising the religion of Islam (Frum, 2003: 152-
153). According to Frum, President Bush had a guiding principle of not committing himself to 
any one particular course when it came to foreign policies until he had to. President Bush would 
also often allow two courses of action to develop at the same time to give himself more time to 
decide which one was superior. It was this line of thinking that lead to what Frum calls: the 
great ‘why do they hate us?’ debate.8 The internal White House battle took place in October 
2001 (Frum, 2003: 168). President Bush asks and answers the ‘why do they hate us?’ question 
in Text 2 from 20 September 2001, and I analyse this in chapter section 5.2. Meanwhile, this 
section explores the story behind the question ‘why do they hate us?’ and the internal struggle in 
the administration of how to guide President Bush. When reading Frum’s account, it is clear that 
the ‘they’ in ‘why do they hate us?’ are Muslims, and according to Frum by early October 2001 
it was no longer possible to pretend that ‘Bin Ladenism’ was a peripheral phenomenon in the 
Muslim world. Frum dismisses the possibility that ‘they’ hate ‘us’ because of any unjust, pro-
Israeli and anti-Islamic policies by the US, but he does so in the light of how the US should/can 
respond to the terrorist attacks. The logic was that if ‘they’ hate ‘us’ for our unjust policies, then 
‘we’ should give ‘them’ a Palestinian state.9 But, Frum argues, that would indicate that if ‘they’ 
kill more Americans ‘they’ will get more bonuses, and that would not be right – so the US and 
                                                 
8 The ‘why do they hate us?’ question was not only debated within the White House. As Gregory indicates, on 
15 October 2001 Newsweek distributed a thematic issue organized around the question, and Gregory comments 
that the answer, significantly, was to be found among ‘them’ and not among ‘us’. (Gregory, 2004: 21-22). 
9 Frum tells the story in this fashion: that within days of 11 September, the US State Department began to leak a 
story that Colin Powell was to make a big speech on the Middle East, presumably staking out a more pro Pales-
tinian line. Most of the Bush White House reacted to this idea with horror. The speech was postponed time and 
again and in the end Condoleezza Rice managed to remove all of its policy content (Frum, 2003: 169).  
  
Israel were not to blame for the terrorist attacks. There was thus a need for another reason for 
‘them’ to hate ‘us’, and the great ‘why do they hate us?’ debate divided the administration into 
two camps with two competing theories.  
The two theories were presented, according to Frum, by the two most powerful aides to 
the President: Karen Hughes10 and Karl Rove11. Hughes’s answer to the question was that ‘they’ 
hate ‘us’ because ‘they’ do not understand ‘us’. ‘They’ think ‘we’ are materialistic, immoral and 
godless. Therefore the solution would be to convince ‘them’ that Americans are honest God-
fearing people. Rove provided another answer, which was influenced by Orientalist scholar 
Bernard Lewis: ‘they’ hate ‘us’ because ‘they’ resent ‘us’. ‘They’ resent ‘us’ because ‘they’ 
have not reconciled themselves with the fact that ‘they’ are no longer the great Empire that 
‘they’ once were. ‘They’ resent ‘us’ because ‘we’ now possess what ‘they’ ought to possess. 
Thus it is unlikely that Muslim hatred of the US will decline until Islam itself changes. And here 
is the punch-line: while waiting for that change to happen, the US should recognize that al-
though it cannot be loved, it can enforce respect. The surest way to forfeit this respect is to seem 
overeager to please. According to Frum it was Hughes’s views that had influenced the Presi-
dent’s interpretation of ‘why do they hate us?’, as delivered in speeches, in the first two months 
after 11 September 2001, but after that President Bush decided that it was time to go with 
Rove’s theory (Frum, 2003: 153-175).  
There are some particularly interesting points in Frum’s story. One thing to which I re-
acted after going through all of my empirical material was the entire lack of any recognition that 
the reason behind the terrorist attacks could have anything to do with US foreign policy. Frum’s 
story suggests that the reason for the 11 September attacks and the response of going to war are 
closely linked. My focus in this project is not to trace the reason behind the attacks, but rather to 
investigate how the response of going to war was discursively constructed. Frum’s account of 
how the Bush administration dealt with the question of ‘why do they hate us?’ illustrated the 
apparent lack of interest in finding a reasonable answer. The focus was on which type of re-
sponse they wanted to go with and adjusting the answer to the question accordingly. If the goal 
was not to alienate the Islamic world, then go with Hughes’s answer that ‘they’ do not under-
stand ‘us’. If, however, the response was to be war, then the Bush administration had to go with 
                                                 
10 Karen Hughes served as an adviser to President Bush for more than ten years. As Counsellor to the President 
for his first 18 months in the White House, she was involved in major domestic and foreign policy issues, led the 
communications’ effort in the first year of the ‘war against terrorism’, and managed the White House Offices of 
Communications, Media Affairs, Speechwriting and Press Secretary (US Department of State homepage: 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/53692.htm). 
11 Karl Rove was until recently (April 2006) Deputy Chief of Staff in the Bush administration, senior advisor and 
chief political strategist, also widely referred to as ‘Bush’s brain’ (commentary by Elvik, Halvor, in Dagblandet 
20 April 2006).  
  
Rove/Lewis. The answer to the question ‘why do they hate us?’ had to be that ‘they’ hate ‘us’ 
because ‘they’ resent ‘us’, with the only possible US response being to show no weakness and 
enforce respect. 
Returning to the empirical material, one aspect of ‘them’ will now be examined, namely 
‘them’ as Muslims, and how ‘they’ as Muslims are constructed and changed through the mate-
rial. In the first quotation from Text 2, President Bush constructs Islam as peace (Bush, 2001b): 
The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and 
the vast majority of Muslim clerics ─ a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam. […] 
I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. We respect your faith. It is practised 
freely by many millions of Americans, and by millions more in countries that America counts as friends. Its 
teachings are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of 
Allah. The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of 
America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network 
of terrorists, and every government that supports them (2: 3: 1 - 4: 12). 
President Bush here constructs an ‘Islam is peace’ discourse. I view ‘faith’ in the sentence ‘We 
respect your faith’ as a nodal point. An ‘Islam is peace’ discourse is made meaningful through a 
chain of equivalence linking the moments ‘freely’, ‘Americans’, ‘friends’, ‘good’ and ‘peaceful’ 
to the nodal point ‘faith’. It is also pointed out that ‘we’, the United States, have ‘many Muslim 
friends’ and ‘Arab friends’. There are furthermore two representations of ‘them’ in this quota-
tion: ‘they’ are first represented in positive terms as ‘Islam is peace’; whereas the actions of 
‘them’ are not ─ ‘those who commit evil’. Thus it is made clear that not all Muslims are terror-
ists, that actually ‘they’, the terrorists, are a ‘fringe movement, a fringe form of Islamic extrem-
ism’. This representation of ‘them’ is constructed through a negative chain of equivalence link-
ing the moments ‘perverts’, ‘radical’, ‘evil’ and ‘traitors’ to ‘them’. President Bush even goes 
as far as to suggest that Bin Laden and his followers were trying to ‘hijack Islam itself’’. Impor-
tantly, at this stage in time in the negative construction of ‘them’, ‘they’ are represented as a 
relatively small group of people ─ there are no ordinary people in this group and it is not a 
movement. ‘They’ are a limited number of people, a peripheral extremist Islamic movement.     
Utilizing Laclau and Mouffe’s vocabulary, in the quotation above ‘Islam’ can be seen as a mo-
ment in an ‘us-them’ discourse. Through a specific articulation, President Bush tries to obtain 
closure in an ‘us-them’ discourse, where the identity of ‘Islam’ is one of peace. The negative 
representation of ‘them’ is constructed outside the domain of ‘Islam’: ‘they’ are ‘traitors to their 
own faith’.  
On 10 October 2001 President Bush spoke at the UN General Assembly, which is Text 4 
in my material (Bush, 2001d). According to Frum, this was when the change from Hughes to 
  
Rove materialized. There would be no more ‘Islam is peace’. Now it was time to ‘enforce re-
spect’ (Frum, 2003: 173). In this speech President Bush continues to insist that ‘they’, the terror-
ists: 
are increasingly isolated by their own hatred and extremism. They cannot hide behind Islam (4: 3: 17-18).  
‘They’ are still therefore represented by President Bush as fanatics and not proper Muslims, but 
in this speech Islam is not praised in the same manner as in the speech quoted above. At this 
stage in time, the war in Afghanistan had been going on for a month and after thanking those 
countries that approved the war through Resolution 1373, President Bush goes on to make the 
expectations of the US explicit: 
Yet, even beyond Resolution 1373, more is required, and more is expected of our coalition against terror. 
We’re asking for a comprehensive commitment to this fight. We must unite in opposing all terrorists, not 
just some of them. In this world there are good causes and bad causes, and we may disagree on where the 
line is drawn. Yet, there is no such thing as a good terrorist. No national aspiration, no remembered wrong 
can ever justify the deliberate murder of the innocent. Any government that rejects this principle, trying to 
pick and choose its terrorist friends, will know the consequences (4: 5: 27 - 6: 6). 
President Bush makes it clear with this statement that the war in Afghanistan is not the end of 
the US response to the 11 September terrorist attacks, thus the ‘war on terrorism’ continues. 
Furthermore, it not only continues, but it expands: ‘We must unite in opposing all terrorists, not 
just some of them’.  I interpret this quote to be directed at the situation in the Middle East, and 
particularly the Palestinian/Israeli conflict.12 Moreover, I take the statement ‘In this world there 
are good causes and bad causes, and we may disagree on where the line is drawn’ to be di-
rected at divergent world opinion on where the main grievance lies in the conflict. This, how-
ever, is where the tolerance of differing opinions ends: ‘Yet, there is no such thing as a good 
terrorist. No national aspiration, no remembered wrong can ever justify the deliberate murder 
of the innocent’.  I will argue that from President Bush’s perspective it is only the Palestinian 
side that performs terrorism (‘deliberate murder of the innocent’) and not the state of Israel. 
Thus it is the Islamic ‘aspiration’ and ‘remembered wrong’ to which President Bush is refer-
ring. I interpret the last sentence in the quotation to be directed at any Islamic state that supports 
Palestine: ‘Any government that rejects this principle, trying to pick and choose its terrorist 
friends, will know the consequences’. With this warning by President Bush in the UN, the ‘war 
on terrorism’ is thus expanded: there will be consequences for any states that the US decides are 
involved with terrorism as terrorism is defined by the US. Moreover, this particular warning is 
                                                 
12 Frum comments on this quote: ‘There would be no more tolerance for the corrupt side arrangements that many 
Islamic governments had made with terror. And terror did not become more tolerable when it targeted Israelis 
rather than Americans’ (Frum, 2003: 173-174).  
  
directed towards Islamic states that fraternize with Palestine. Thus I will argue that ‘they’ are 
constructed at two levels in this speech. First, at the individual level, ‘they’ are the actual per-
formers of terrorist acts, and these are misguided, extreme Muslims hiding behind a false label 
of ‘holy war’. Second, in this speech ‘they’ are also any Islamic states that reject the principles 
set forward by President Bush.  
This speech was held in the UN, and it is possible to ask the question: What if some of 
the points in President Bush’s speech had been delivered by a representative of ‘them’? Could 
the exact same words be directed at the US or Israel? Could one of ‘them’ have said: ‘we must 
unite in opposing all terrorists, not just some of them’, meaning that the UN should also con-
sider opposing terrorism performed by states? ‘They’ could have followed up with: ‘Yet, there is 
no such thing as a good terrorist. No national aspiration, no remembered wrong can ever justify 
the deliberate murder of the innocent’.  In this context this would mean either legitimate griev-
ance going back to the Second World War concerning Jews or legitimate US grievances con-
cerning 11 September. These grievances could then not legitimate bombing the state of Af-
ghanistan, resulting in the killing of innocent Afghanis besides toppling the Taliban. This para-
graph utilizes a particular discourse analytical strategy of substitution. Substitution draws theo-
retically on the structuralist point that a statement always gains its meaning through being dif-
ferent from something else that has been said or could have been said (Jørgensen, 2001: 242-
243). In relation to the quotation above, by using this strategy of substitution it becomes obvious 
that the meaning that President Bush presents as taken for granted and ‘universal’ can be seen as 
a contingent attempt to pin down the meaning of the statement hegemonically.   
One last quotation is presented that highlights the relationship between ‘us’ and ‘them’, 
and how the official US view of ‘Islam’ alters in the empirical material. This quotation is from 
the seventh and final text: the official National Security Strategy from September 2002 (Bush, 
2002c):    
The war on terrorism is not a clash of civilizations. It does, however, reveal the clash inside a civilization, a 
battle for the future of the Muslim world. This is a struggle of ideas and this is an area where America must 
excel (7: 38: 6-9). 
The first sentence can be seen as a direct reference to Huntington’s theory of the clash of civili-
zations referred to at the beginning of this chapter. The Bush administration clearly wants to 
distance the ‘war on terrorism’ from any association to a ‘Western civilization’ at war with an 
‘Islamic civilization’. The second sentence could indicate that the US perceives the blame for 
the 11 September terrorist attacks as lying within an Islamic civilization. Thus in relation to the 
‘why do they hate us?’ question, the answer is found within ‘them’. It is not any clash between 
  
‘us’ and ‘them’; the clash is within ‘their’ civilization and that is what led to the terrorist attacks 
on 11 September 2001.  
This section has focused on Islam as one aspect of ‘them’ (in relation to ‘us’) within the 
context of constructing a ‘war on terrorism’, and how the perspective on Islam changed during 
the one year timeframe covered by my material. I have argued that ‘Islam’ has been a moment in 
an ‘us-them’ discourse, but a moment containing three different meanings: in Text 2 Islam was 
represented as peace; in Text 4 Islam is represented as resentful, not only as a religion but as a 
former empire (‘they’ have never reconciled themselves with the loss of their power and domi-
nation); finally, in Text 7 Islam is represented as a failed civilization that is not able to conform 
to modern life.  
 
5.1.4 ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ Revisited 
This chapter section has shown how the narrative of ‘either you are with us or you are with the 
terrorists’ is repeated throughout my empirical material, and that the relationship between the 
two options ─ ‘us’ or ‘them’ ─ was constructed as antagonistic. I have also suggested that 
President Bush early on made two crucial strategic choices that had consequences for the rela-
tionship between ‘us’ and ‘them’: first, defining the 11 September terrorist attacks as acts of war 
and thus paving the way for a warlike response by ‘us’; second, from day one President Bush 
made it clear that any state that harboured terrorists would be regarded as equally guilty as the 
actual perpetrators. This warning was repeated in different ways throughout the empirical mate-
rial. I have also shown how President Bush discursively constructed a hierarchy within the ‘us’, 
with the US as the main focal point, but also the construction of friends, allies and partners in 
the ‘war on terrorism’. With the relational logic of ‘us’ and ‘them’, the construction of ‘them’ is 
also a construction of ‘us’, and with the ‘either-or’ feature, when one category is expanded the 
other shrinks. This chapter section has focused on one aspect of ‘them’, namely ‘them’ as Mus-
lims, demonstrating how this aspect discursively changed and how the category of ‘them’ was 
expanded in the material.  
The next chapter section ─ 5.2 ─ will follow up the distinction of ‘us’ and ‘them’ by fo-
cusing on representations of ‘them’ as fear and ‘us’ as freedom. In the context of constructing a 
‘war on terrorism’, this distinction is especially visible in the first two texts, even though repre-
sentations of freedom and fear persist throughout the one-year timeframe. I will show how 
‘they’ are constructed as al Qaeda-supported and supporting the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, 
and how freedom and the ‘American way of life’ are constructed as synonymous.  
  
Thereafter, chapter section 5.3 will show how the ‘war on terrorism’ is constructed as a battle 
between good and evil. This construction will be analysed through a religious lens, where ‘we’ 
are constructed as purely good and aligned with God while ‘they’ are represented as entirely 
evil. This rhetorical feature of a sharp distinction between good and evil reached its peak in Text 
4, where the evil category is expanded to include evil states as defined by the US ‘us’. 
Finally, chapter section 5.4 will analyse representations of civilization and barbarism in 
the empirical material. This distinction is also clear early on in the construction of the ‘war on 
terrorism’, and I will argue for an intertextual relation between Texts 2 and 3 where President 
Bush constructs his vision of how civilization should deal with barbarians. I will also analyse 
how framing the ‘war on terrorism’ as a war between civilization and barbarism legitimizes 
exceptional actions by ‘us’ against ‘them’, and how this exceptionality is embedded into the 
official National Security Strategy. 
 
5.2 The American Way of Life: A Discourse of Freedom and Fear 
A prominent feature in US self-image is the notion that it is an exceptional nation, and that the 
‘American way of life’ embodies supreme and universal values (Moen, 2005: 78-81; and Buzan, 
2004: 154-165). Moen points out that American nationalism, what he calls the ‘American way 
of life’, is in fact unusual because it is not dependent on special ethnic or racial constellations. It 
is rather based on a common value system and a unique political decision-making structure with 
its emphasis on a balance of power that is seen as superior to any other (Moen, 2005: 78-81). 
Buzan argues that the US is the most liberal of the Western states, with its values of nineteenth-
century liberalism and its laissez-faire, anti-state attitude based on the idea of individual free-
dom. However, when it comes to socio-economic rights, there is a remarkable divergence be-
tween the US and other democratic governments. In a comparative perspective, the US has a 
relatively non-consensus-based conception of economic rights, particularly in the areas of labour 
and social welfare. This tendency of not recognizing socio-economic rights finds few parallels, 
neither in the communist world, the developing world, nor among advanced industrial democra-
cies. Moreover, Buzan observes that the idea that the US is exceptional because of its economic 
and political values, and that it is destined to shape the future of humankind, is the ‘everyday 
stuff’ of American political rhetoric (Buzan, 2004: 155).  
This ‘everyday stuff’ is prominent in my empirical material. The key value at stake in the 
‘war on terrorism’ is represented as freedom. As I will show below, President Bush declared that 
freedom was at war with fear at an early stage. Thus, in the process of discursively constructing 
the ‘war on terrorism’, the first representation of ‘us’ was the US ‘us’ being the incarnation of 
  
freedom and ‘they’ being a manifestation of fear.  Furthermore, freedom is a persistent and fre-
quent sign throughout my empirical material. President Bush ascribes the value of freedom to 
‘us’ and the value of fear to ‘them’. The other discourses that I have delineated are also struc-
tured in binary oppositions between good-evil and civilized-barbarian. However, freedom is not 
the expected opposite of fear. Nevertheless, in the context of a ‘war on terrorism’, it makes 
sense that ‘they’ are represented as fear, as terrorism is defined as the systematic use of terror 
that can be seen as synonymous with fear.13 In addition to President Bush declaring ‘them’ as 
fear, I will also argue that in my material freedom appears as a defining, fundamental concept, 
mainly in relation to expressions of opposition to freedom. ‘They’ are enemies of freedom. To 
understand fully why President Bush uses freedom as synonymous with the national identity of 
the US ‘us’, one would have to undertake a historical study of the cultural roots of the United 
States. In this chapter section I will, however, attempt to explore how the representations of ‘us’ 
as freedom and ‘them’ as fear are utilized in the discursive construction of the ‘war on terror-
ism’.  
I will develop my argument in three steps: First, I will argue that President Bush con-
structs the ‘American way of life’ as synonymous with freedom and that the terrorist attacks on 
11 September 2001 were seen as attacks on the ‘American way of life’. The ‘war on terrorism’ 
is thus constructed as defending the ‘American way of life’ that is equal to freedom. I will also 
argue that it was essential at an early stage in constructing the ‘war on terrorism’ to link al 
Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to fear. Second, I will point to how the war in 
Afghanistan became the logical response to the terrorist attacks, and how the state of Afghani-
stan went from foe to friend. Third, I will develop an argument concerning the scope of the sign 
freedom constructed by the Bush administration. 
 
5.2.1 Defending the ‘American Way of Life’ Against Fear 
The previous chapter section argued that in Text 1 ─ the prime-time speech on 11 September 
2001 ─ President Bush constructed the identity of the myth ‘America’ through a positive chain 
of equivalence, including the moments of ‘peace’, ‘security’, ‘justice’, ‘freedom’ and ‘goodness’ 
(Bush, 2001a). I will here elaborate on this construction, and introduce a parallel myth, namely 
the ‘American way of life’. The construction of this myth is especially visible in the first two 
speeches of my material, beginning already in the first paragraph of the first speech, where 
President Bush unites the nation by referring to ‘our way of life’ that is linked to freedom (Bush, 
2001a): 
                                                 
13 For a definition, see Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary at http://www.m-w.com.  
  
Good evening. Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series 
of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts. […] America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest 
beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining (1:1:4-17). 
In this quotation President Bush takes for granted that all US citizens are familiar with what ‘our 
[the American] way of life’ stands for: in one word it stands for ‘freedom’. It was America’s 
‘freedom’ that was attacked. Thus the logic is that ‘they’ are the opposite of ‘us’; ‘they’ are 
enemies of freedom and thus enemies of the ‘American way of life’. With the sentence ‘America 
was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the 
world’, President Bush confirms the myth of the ‘American way of life’ as exceptional, with a 
positive connotation. ‘We’ were attacked because ‘we’ are exceptional; the ‘American way of 
life’ is the way of life that offers the most freedom and opportunity in the world. In the context 
of a discourse where ‘we’ represent freedom and ‘they’ represent fear, President Bush con-
structed a myth with this first speech: ‘the American way of life’, to which he linked the mo-
ments ‘peace’, ‘security’, ‘justice’, ‘goodness’ and most important ‘freedom’. ‘They’ must be 
the opposite of ‘us’, since ‘they’ are constructed as attacking ‘us’ because ‘we’ are the incarna-
tion of freedom.   
Nine days after 11 September, President Bush delivered a speech to a Joint Session of 
Congress and the American people (Bush, 2001b, or Text 2 of my material). The headline on the 
White House Homepage was, and still is, ‘President Bush declares freedom at war with fear’.14 I 
will therefore focus my analysis in this section on this text. At this stage the ‘war on terrorism’ 
was thus seen as a war between ‘us’ represented as freedom and ‘they’ represented as fear. In 
the first part of the speech President Bush constructs ‘them’ as the enemies of freedom: 
Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. […] On September the 11th, 
enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. […] and night fell on a different world, a 
world where freedom itself is under attack. […] Americans are asking: Who attacked our country? [...] Al 
Qaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money; its goal is remaking the 
world ─ and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere. […] The terrorists’ directive commands 
them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans, and make no distinction among military and civil-
ians, including women and children (2: 1: 18 - 3: 5). 
The first sentence concerns ‘us’: ‘we’ are in ‘danger’ and ‘we’ need to ‘defend freedom’. After 
that the focus changes to ‘them’: ‘they’ are the reason that ‘we’ are in danger; ‘they’ ‘committed 
an act of war’ against ‘us’/freedom. By perpetrating this act of war against ‘us’ ─ that is, the US 
represented as freedom ─ ‘they’ are constructed to have attacked the entire ‘world’. After this 
universal depiction of ‘them’ as enemies of freedom, President Bush becomes more particular as 
                                                 
14 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/ 
  
to who ‘they’ are. ‘They’ are al Qaeda, which is compared to the mafia. The mafia could be seen 
as a well-organized criminal organization, thus al Qaeda must be a well-organized terror move-
ment, a movement that spreads fear. The comparison to the mafia continues as President Bush 
states that the mafia’s goal is ‘making money’, which does not sound too bad when compared to 
al Qaeda, which is given the aim of ‘remaking the world – and imposing its radical beliefs on 
people everywhere’. President Bush again constructs the attacks in the US as a concern of the 
entire world: all people in the world are affected by this attack on the ‘American way of life’. 
The last sentence in the quotation above, however, does indicate that some people have more to 
worry about than others, thus with a starting point in who ‘they’ are it becomes clear who ‘we’ 
are. In order of importance, ‘we’ are ‘Americans’, ‘Christians’ and ‘Jews’. ‘They’ are continu-
ally constructed as heinous. There is supposedly a ‘terrorist directive’ that ‘commands’ ‘them’ 
to ‘kill Christians and Jews’ and ‘to kill all Americans’ and to make ‘no distinction’ between 
‘military and civilians’ ─ ‘they’ even aim to kill ‘women and children’. I will argue that this 
sentence reveals several things: ‘they’ do not only want to take over the world with their radical 
beliefs, but that ‘they’ actually have the goal of killing civilians. Thus ‘they’ symbolize an ex-
treme notion of fear. President Bush also constructs the line of conflict to be one of religion: 
‘they’ are Muslims, and now it is clear that ‘we’ are Christians and Jews in addition to all 
Americans. Thus President Bush draws the boundary of a specific social space where the territo-
rial myth of the ‘American way of life’ now also includes Christians and Jews. There is also a 
uniting aspect: all Americans should be frightened. It does not matter what political views you 
have or what religion you profess, if you are a US citizen and thus part of the ‘American way of 
life’ ‘they’ want to kill you. Thus ‘they’ are given the aim of killing the people of the US, and 
not only the government.  
The next quotation is a continuation of the previous, as ‘they’ still represent fear, which 
is constructed on the basis of ‘them’ being the total opposite of ‘us’. Now President Bush goes 
on to link the al Qaeda ‘them’ to the state of Afghanistan (Bush, 2001b): 
The leadership of al Qaeda has great influence in Afghanistan and supports the Taliban regime in control-
ling most of that country. In Afghanistan, we see al Qaeda’s vision for the world. […] The United States re-
spects the people of Afghanistan ─ after all, we are currently its largest source of humanitarian aid ─ but 
we condemn the Taliban regime. It is not only repressing its own people; it is threatening people every-
where by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists. By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban re-
gime is committing murder (2: 3: 12-23). 
There is an obvious problem with both of the slogans: a ‘war on terrorism’ and ‘freedom at war 
with fear’. If ‘they’ are represented as ‘terrorism’ or ‘fear’, neither is accessible to military 
power. Thus as Gregory points out, ‘they’ had to be made visible and the first move was to iden-
  
tify al Qaeda with Afghanistan, to fold the one into the other, so that it could be the object of a 
conventional military campaign (Gregory, 2004: 49-50). I argue that this is precisely what 
President Bush is doing in the quotation above, and he does this in three steps. First, al Qaeda is 
linked to Afghanistan – ‘they’ have ‘great influence’ in the country and ‘support the Taliban 
regime’. Second, Afghanistan is constructed as being al Qaeda’s ideal state – ‘their’ (al Qaeda’s) 
‘vision for the world’. And President Bush tries to reassure the Afghan people by stating that the 
US ‘respects’ them, the evidence being that the US is ‘currently’ their ‘largest source of hu-
manitarian aid’. Thus ‘we’ are the opposite of ‘them’. ‘They’ want to kill all the people of the 
US, plus Christians and Jews, while ‘we’ are only after the ‘Taliban regime’. Third, the Taliban 
regime is equated to al Qaeda; the Taliban is constructed in similar terms as al Qaeda. ‘They’ 
are politically repressive, ‘they’ are ‘threatening people everywhere’ and ‘they’ too are murder-
ing criminals ─ the ‘Taliban regime is committing murder’. With this statement, the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan and al Qaeda now form a coherent ‘them’.  
After stating that ‘they’ have a directive to kill all Americans, it is natural to wonder why 
‘they’ have this goal. The previous chapter section discussed an internal debate at the White 
House concerning the answer to the question ‘why do they hate us?’ According to Frum, the 
debate had its peak in October 2001 (Frum, 2003: 168). The quotation below is still Text 2, so in 
September 2001 President Bush answered the question like this (Bush, 2001b): 
Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber ─ a democ-
ratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms ─ our freedom of re-
ligion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other. […] These 
terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life. […] the only way to defeat terror-
ism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows (2: 4: 15 – 6: 4). 
As one can observe, it is still ‘they’ that are constructed as representing the opposite of ‘us’. 
‘They’ hate the American people because ‘they’ hate ‘a democratically elected government’. 
‘Their’ leaders are the opposite: ‘they’ are ‘self-appointed’. ‘They hate our freedoms’, that is the 
freedoms that are at the base of the ‘American way of life’ – the ‘freedom of religion’, ‘freedom 
of speech’, etc. Thus ‘they’, ‘these terrorists’ (al Qaeda and the Taliban regime) kill ‘not merely 
to end lives’ (all Americans and Christians and Jews) but ‘to disrupt and end a way of life’ – the 
‘American way of life’.  
Through constructing ‘them’ with these intentions and goals, ‘they’ are dehumanized and 
become like parasites. Hence President Bush’s logical conclusion within the oppositional struc-
ture of freedom and fear is that the only way to defeat ‘them’ as a ‘threat to our way of life is to 
stop’ ‘them’, ‘eliminate’ ‘them’, and ‘destroy’ ‘them’. This response will be discussed further in 
  
section 5.4 concerning the distinction between what is discursively constructed as civilization 
and barbarism.  
After constructing the enemy as fear, and after having made fear tangible as al Qaeda and 
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, President Bush ends his speech by declaring a war between 
freedom and fear and the superiority of ‘us’ compared to ‘them’ (Bush, 2001b):  
As long as the United States of America is determined and strong, this will not be an age of terror; this will 
be an age of liberty, here and across the world. […] Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered 
great loss. And in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment. Freedom and fear are at 
war. The advance of human freedom ─ the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time 
─ now depends on us. Our nation ─ this generation ─ will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and 
our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage. […] The course of this con-
flict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at 
war, and we know that God is not neutral between them (2: 8: 14 - 9: 9). 
The future of the world is dependent on a ‘determined’ and ‘strong’ United States that is the 
difference between a future of ‘terror’ and a future of ‘liberty’. I will argue that ‘determined’ 
and ‘strong’ can be connected to the remarks about how to deal with the enemies of the ‘Ameri-
can way of life’: ‘eliminate’ and ‘destroy’. The ‘human freedom’ of all people on earth is de-
pendent on the US. President Bush constructs the ‘American way of life’ as the opposite of the 
fear that ‘they’ represent and impose on ‘us’. He constructs an ‘us’, the US, which will lead the 
world into an ‘age of liberty’. This task is constructed literally as a war between freedom and 
fear. President Bush finally links ‘justice’ to ‘freedom’ and ‘cruelty’ to ‘fear’. Thus ‘our’ uni-
versal value of freedom is linked to a superior morality – ‘justice’ is on ‘our’ side. ‘They’, on the 
other hand, are ascribed the particular negative value of ‘cruelty’. According to President Bush, 
‘they’ committed an act of war against ‘us’ because of our ‘American way of life’, our values of 
freedom. Hence it becomes the US’s ‘mission’ to lead the war against fear and the world to-
wards an ‘age of liberty’. The religious aspect of this construction will be discussed further in 
section 5.3 in a discourse about good and evil. 
My claim here is that President Bush, again through a chain of equivalence, discursively 
constructs an oppositional discourse of freedom and fear. The myth about the ‘American way of 
life’ is constructed in relation to the difference from ‘them’ and their ‘way of life’. The ‘Ameri-
can way of life’ is constructed to embody a universal value of freedom, to which President Bush 
links several further value-based attributes such as ‘opportunity’, ‘justice’, ‘goodness’ and 
‘peace’, etc. ‘Their’ ‘way of life’ on the other hand is constructed as both different and outside 
‘ours’. ‘Their’ way of life is constructed through linking opposite value-based attributes to it, 
such as ‘radical beliefs’, ‘cruelty’, ‘murderous’, etc. Constructing ‘them’ as both different and 
  
outside ‘us’ implies that none of ‘their’ attributes can exist inside the ‘American way of life’. 
Therefore if the ‘American way of life’ is defined by ‘freedom’, ‘justice’, ‘security’, ‘peace’ and 
‘goodness’, then the ‘American way of life’ does not involve suppression, injustice, insecurity, 
war or evilness.  
In a discourse of freedom and fear, I argue that President Bush strives to obtain closure 
where the nodal point and moment ‘freedom’ is represented as having a universal meaning. I 
will claim that what is considered the meaning of freedom is both historically and culturally 
contingent and not timeless and universal. Furthermore, it can be argued, like Lazar and Lazar 
do, that the universal sense of freedom that President Bush constructs is rather freedom in the 
particularistic sense of Western capitalist liberal democracy (Lazar and Lazar, 2004: 228-229). 
In addition, Lazar and Lazar argue that when President Bush links freedom to, for example, 
‘peace’, ‘liberty’ and ‘justice’, the notion of freedom is a very particular politico-economic ide-
ology that appropriates to itself attributes of righteousness. Thus the US claim of the high moral 
ground is reinforced, together with the universalization of the values that it advocates as norma-
tive (Lazar and Lazar, 2004).  
Until now President Bush has constructed a situation where on 11 September 2001 the 
US was attacked by ‘enemies of freedom’, and where fear was made tangible as al Qaeda and 
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The next section will first show how ‘we’ deal with ‘them’ ─ 
the enemy ─ and second, how a former enemy of freedom, the state of Afghanistan, is con-
structed as an ally in the ‘war on terrorism’. 
 
5.2.2 Enduring Freedom? 
The constructed ‘freedom at war with fear’ was set into action in Afghanistan on 7 October 
2001 under the name Enduring Freedom15 (Bush, 2001c). President Bush announced from the 
Treaty Room of the White House that the US was a peaceful nation and that the only manner in 
which to pursue peace in today’s world was to pursue those who threaten it. This way of con-
structing ‘us’ follows the above chain of equivalence that gives meaning to the ‘American way 
of life’. ‘We’ are defined as embodying ‘freedom’, ‘justice’ and ‘goodness’, etc. Hence when 
‘we’ are forced to defend freedom, to defend the ‘American way of life’ by going to war, it is by 
this very definition a just decision:  
We're a peaceful nation. […] In the face of today’s new threat, the only way to pursue peace is to pursue 
those who threaten it. We did not ask for this mission, but we will fulfill it. The name of today’s military 
                                                 
15 The military operation was first named Infinite Justice, but the name was changed when it was pointed out 
how insulting this name would be to Muslims, as only Allah can dispense infinite justice (Gregory, 2004: 48). 
  
operation is Enduring Freedom. We defend not only our precious freedoms, but also the freedom of people 
everywhere to live and raise their children free from fear (3: 2: 13-19). 
President Bush constructs an unquestionable need to use violence to defend ‘freedom’ against 
‘fear’. Fear is here represented by al Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Again, it is 
not only the ‘precious freedoms’ that define the ‘American way of life’ that are threatened, it is 
‘the freedom of people everywhere’.  
Approximately three months later President Bush could announce to the American people 
that freedom had defeated fear in Afghanistan (Bush, 2002a):  
[Our nation has] saved a people from starvation, and freed a country from brutal oppression. The American 
flag flies again over our embassy in Kabul. Terrorists who once occupied Afghanistan now occupy cells at 
Guantanamo Bay. And terrorist leaders who urged followers to sacrifice their lives are running for their 
own. America and Afghanistan are now allies against terror (5: 1: 15-20). 
Afghanistan had been occupied by fear but now ‘we’ have liberated them. ‘We’ the people of 
the US have ‘freed’ our friends the Afghan people from our common enemy – fear ─ embodied 
in the oppressive Taliban regime supporting and supported by al Qaeda. Those who earlier in-
voked fear in the Afghan society are now, thanks to ‘us’, running for ‘their’ own lives. And not 
only that: now the US and Afghanistan are ‘allies’ in the ‘war on terrorism’. Thus a former 
‘they’ has successfully been discursively incorporated into the ‘us’.   
However, at the end of the same speech President Bush looks beyond Afghanistan and 
emphasizes that there still exists a hideous ‘them’ out there (Bush, 2002a):   
Our enemies send other people’s children on missions of suicide and murder. They embrace tyranny and 
death as a cause and a creed. We stand for a different choice, made long ago, on the day of our founding. 
We affirm it again today. We choose freedom and the dignity of every life. Steadfast in our purpose, we 
now press on. We have known freedom’s price. We have shown freedom’s power. And in this great con-
flict, my fellow Americans, we will see freedom’s victory (5:12: 4-10). 
Thus, in the context of an oppositional structuring between freedom and fear, ‘they’ (now no 
longer the state of Afghanistan) are in contrast to ‘us’ obsessed with ‘tyranny’ and ‘death’ and 
exploiting ‘other people’s children’ to project fear through ‘missions of suicide and murder’. 
Conversely, ‘we’ have always, all the way back to ‘our founding’, represented the universal 
value of freedom. On 11 September ‘we’ came to know ‘freedom’s price’, in Afghanistan we 
showed ‘freedom's power’ and in the great conflict between freedom and fear ‘we’ ‘will see 
freedom’s victory’.  
Buzan points out that belief in the essential rightness of American values has been 
greatly reinforced by the fact that the US has been the victor in the three ideological world wars 
  
of the twentieth century (Buzan, 2004: 155). The notion of the ‘American way of life’ as the 
ideal ‘way of life’ is also visible in my material and will be the topic of the following section. 
 
5.2.3 The ‘American Way of Life’: The Only Way of Life? 
In 1989 Francis Fukuyama published an essay entitled The End of History, where he claimed 
that liberal democracy as a system of governance had won such an overwhelming victory over 
other ideologies that liberalism was thus the only legitimate ideology left in the world (Weber, 
2005: 104). The argument was that liberalism does not have any internal irrational contradic-
tions that otherwise lead to the collapse of ideologies, and hence we were witnessing the end of 
history with liberalism as the final form of human government (Weber, 2005). In classic liberal 
economic arguments, the nature of international economic relations is seen as harmonious. Eco-
nomic exchange processes, such as free trade, extend wealth and increase the quality of life for 
everyone who participates. The view is that economics not only brings economic benefits; it 
brings political benefits as well. This happens primarily through the spread of liberal democratic 
institutions in which liberty, freedom and justice for all are guaranteed because the people hold 
political power (Weber, 2005: 105). I will argue that in President Bush’s construction of a war 
between freedom and fear, these ideas have some influence, as can be seen in the following 
quotations from Text 6 (Bush, 2002b) and Text 7 (Bush, 2002c) :  
Today the great powers are also increasingly united by common values, instead of divided by conflicting 
ideologies. […]And the tide of liberty is rising in many other nations. […] Even in China, leaders are dis-
covering that economic freedom is the only lasting source of national wealth. In time, they will find that so-
cial and political freedom is the only true source of national greatness (6: 6: 8-16). 
The concept of ‘free trade’ arose as a moral principle even before it became a pillar of economics. If you 
can make something that others value, you should be able to sell it to them. If others make something that 
you value, you should be able to buy it. This is real freedom, the freedom for a person ─ or a nation ─ to 
make a living (7: 22: 14-17). 
The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive vic-
tory for the forces of freedom ─ and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, 
and free enterprise. […] These values of freedom are right and true for every person, in every society ─ and 
the duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people 
across the globe and across the ages (7: 1: 4-13). 
In the first quotation President Bush constructs a ‘tide of liberty’ that is ‘rising’. Free markets 
and free trade are seen as fundamental aspects of ‘freedom’. I return to the quote concerning 
China, because in this context it can be seen as the perfect example of development towards 
‘freedom’ and more explicitly towards the ‘American way of life’, since a market economy is 
seen as the first building block in the structure of a liberal democratic state. In the second quota-
  
tion, ‘free trade’ is constructed as a ‘moral principle’ and as ‘real freedom’. The concept of 
‘free trade’ is explained in such a simplistic manner as if to emphasize its rightness. Moreover, 
in the third quote ‘freedom, democracy and free enterprise’ are constructed as universal values, 
as they are ‘right and true’ for everyone, everywhere, at all times and most important of all, they 
are eternally linked together. Consequently, it is logical that ‘we’ have to protect these values 
against ‘their enemies’. In the same text we are again reminded of what is at stake (Bush, 
2002c):  
In the war against global terrorism, we will never forget that we are ultimately fighting for our democratic 
values and way of life. Freedom and fear are at war, and there will be no quick or easy end to this conflict 
(7: 11: 10-12). 
Again, the oppositional structuring of freedom and fear are vital for the construction of a ‘war 
on terrorism’. Yet we are again reminded that it is the value of freedom and the ‘American way 
of life’ that ‘we’ are fighting for.  
This chapter section argues that President Bush has tried to obtain closure in what I see as 
a discourse of the structured oppositions of freedom and fear. In this discourse freedom and fear 
are viewed as nodal points. Freedom, I argue, can be seen as the equivalence of the ‘American 
way of life’ and President Bush has linked it to values such as ‘justice’, ‘opportunity’, ‘good-
ness’, ‘free enterprise’ and ‘democracy’, etc. Furthermore, these values are represented not only 
as American values, but as universal and timeless. Thus the values of the ‘American way of life’ 
are eternal. The ‘American way of life’ is constructed in relation to ‘them’ and ‘their’ way of 
life in the sense that ‘they’ represent what ‘we’ are not. ‘They’ represented as fear are linked to 
particular and negative values such as ‘tyranny’, ‘oppression’ and ‘cruelty’, etc. I have also 
pointed to the notion that fear and terrorism are not accessible to military power, and I suggest 
that it was therefore essential for President Bush in the early stages of the ‘war on terrorism’ to 
make fear/terrorism tangible through constructing a link to al Qaeda and the Taliban regime. I 
have furthermore offered an alternative interpretation of the meaning of freedom, where I sug-
gest that the ‘American way of life’ is not universal and timeless but rather a particular social, 
political and economic ideology. Still, the war over values continues and the moral exceptional-
ity of the United States is the focus of the next chapter section. 
 
5.3 The Battle between Good and Evil 
A frequent topic in the literature concerning US foreign policy, especially after 11 September 
2001, is the moralizing rhetoric utilized by President Bush and his administration. A repeated 
term in this respect is the so-called Manichaean tendencies (Buzan, 2004: 157-158; Singer, 
  
2004: 209; and Gregory, 2004: 47-49).The term has its origin in a former world religion, namely 
Manichaeism, which has influenced several of today’s world religions (Thomassen, 2004).16 In 
the year 228, in the area that is today Iraq, a young boy aged twelve called Mani had a vision. 
His Heavenly Twin appeared, sent by the highest God, to teach Mani the mysteries of the true 
religion. The Heavenly Twin revealed to Mani the great mystery of the battle between light and 
darkness, and of a grand war that darkness had initiated. When Mani was 24 years old the Heav-
enly Twin returned and told Mani that it was time for him to go out into the world and teach the 
truth that he had learned, a suggestion that Mani followed. Manichaeism spread throughout the 
world from Spain in the west to China in the east. The Roman Empire introduced Orthodox 
Catholicism as the state religion in around the year 300. Manichaeism was then persecuted, and 
it was soon abolished in Europe. It lasted longer in China, and had followers at least until 
around 1500 (Thomassen, 2004). Singer claims that centuries of suppression and persecution did 
not eradicate the Manichaean way of looking at the world (Singer, 2004: 209). Singer continues 
to explain that after the Reformation, the Manichaean view emerged in some Protestant sects 
and was brought by them to the US where it thrived (Singer, 2004).  
There are no direct lines between Manichaeism and today’s US foreign policy.  Why is it 
then used to describe President Bush’s rhetoric and foreign policy? The so-called Manichean 
tendencies are related to a strongly dualistic worldview portrayed by Manichaeism as the battle 
between light and darkness and good and evil. The history of the world is also seen as a progres-
sive process where the God of justice and truth fights against the evil powers of violence and 
lies. In a strict religious sense this dualism is the notion that there can be no Satan in God and no 
God in Satan, and that it is a duty of every good Manichaean to fight God’s fight against Satan. 
According to Singer, President Bush’s readiness to see the world in a dualistic manner, where 
the US is pure and good and its enemies are wholly evil, has roots in an American-Manichaean 
tradition (Singer, 2004.). I claim that throughout my empirical material there is a clear opposi-
tional structuring between good and evil and that the dualistic worldview of Manichaeism can be 
useful in exploring how the ‘war on terrorism’ was discursively constructed by President Bush.  
The dualism of ‘us’ representing goodness and ‘them’ representing pure evil is evident 
from the very beginning of my material, as are the other three sub-discourses. Within what I call 
a discourse of good and evil, however, there is a development. Specifically, the concept of evil is 
expanded by President Bush in my material to include more and more in the evil category. Ac-
cording to Svendsen, there is an increasing degree of comparison in President Bush’s rhetoric, 
                                                 
16 This is a transcript of a lecture held by Professor Einar Thomassen at  Skjervheimseminaret in 2004. 
  
where as a first step the acts as such are characterized as evil. Later on he extends this evil to 
include also the method (terrorism), then the perpetrators, the ideology and, finally, all states 
that harbour, support or aid terrorist as defined by ‘us’ (Svendsen, 2002). ‘They’ being evil is 
thus expanded in the one-year timeframe that my material covers.  
In addition to the development of the evil category, I will also in this chapter section ex-
plore the construction of ‘us’ as representing good. I will furthermore show how President Bush 
compares the situation today with the Second World War and the Cold War. Finally, I will argue 
that the ‘war on terrorism’ can be interpreted as part of an eternal battle between the forces of 
good and evil.  
 
5.3.1 Constructing ‘Them’ as Evil and ‘Us’ as Good 
I suggest that there is a constructed dualism between ‘us’ as good and ‘them’ as evil in my em-
pirical material. This process is relational: ‘us’ as good is constructed on the basis that ‘we’ are 
not evil; and ‘they’ are constructed as evil on the basis that ‘they’ are not good. ‘We’ possess no 
evilness and ‘they’ possess no goodness. In the construction of the ‘war on terrorism’, this sharp 
distinction between good and evil was an essential moment from the very beginning, as can be 
observed in Text 1 (Bush, 2001a):   
Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror. […] Today, our nation saw evil, 
the very worst of human nature. […] And I pray they will be comforted by a power greater than any of us, 
spoken through the ages in Psalm 23: ‘Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear 
no evil, for You are with me’. […] Yet, we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in 
our world (1: 1: 7 - 2: 21). 
In this section I utilize some of Lazar and Lazar’s analytical points regarding President Bush 
constructing ‘them’ as evil and ‘us’ as good (Lazar and Lazar, 2004: 236-238). They point out 
that President Bush’s construction of ‘them’ as evil is done simply through lexical reiteration of 
the word ‘evil’.  In the quote above I argue that it is the acts that are evil ─ ‘evil despicable acts 
of terror’.  Furthermore, Lazar and Lazar point out that evil can also be linked to the enemy 
through action, as the object of ‘our’ perceptual vision: ‘today, our nation saw evil, the very 
worst of human nature’. This way of contextualizing the attacks not only as a terrorist attack, 
but as a threat that goes beyond the mere attacks as such ─ makes the threat of evil immediate 
and real. ‘We’ on the other hand are constructed as ‘defending all that is good and just in our 
world’. Thus President Bush from the beginning makes a link between ‘us’ being good and jus-
tice. The US is on the side of good, although, according to Lazar and Lazar, this is seldom stated 
explicitly. Instead, it is constructed in comparison with an alignment with God and religion. I 
argue that with President Bush’s biblical quote above, he positions God with the US: ‘I fear no 
  
evil, for You are with me’. In Text 2, several of the moments in the constructed dualism between 
good and evil are brought to life (Bush, 2001b): 
The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, 
have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them. Fellow citizens, we’ll meet 
violence with patient justice ─ assured of the rightness of our cause, and confident of the victories to come. 
In all that lies before us, may God grant us wisdom, and may He watch over the United States of America 
(2: 9: 8-13). 
In general, a connection to God – the essence of all that is good – can be expressed in several 
ways. First, Lazar and Lazar point to God being appropriated to validate the expressed values of 
the ‘us’: ‘Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that 
God is not neutral between them.’ Thus the value of ‘freedom’ and ‘justice’ can be seen as di-
vinely sanctioned in addition to being moments in a discourse constructing ‘us’. Second, the link 
between ‘us’ and God is made through the constant invocation of blessings on the nation: ‘may 
God grant us wisdom, and may He watch over the United States of America’.  
I further argue that President Bush naturalizes the relationship between ‘us’ as good and 
‘them’ as evil ─ that is, ‘us’ and ‘them’ are constructed as enemies from creation. This can be 
seen as yet another process of making culture into nature. The conflict is depicted as a process, 
as an eternal battle, where of course ‘God is not neutral’, between the forces of good (‘freedom’ 
and ‘justice’) and evil (‘fear’ and ‘cruelty’). After this universal construction, where ‘us’ is the 
values of goodness/Godliness and ‘they’ represent evil/Satan, President Bush becomes more 
particular. In the next sentence, the ‘us’ are the people of the United States, ‘fellow citizens’. 
Again, a religious dualism is expressed: ‘we’ represent ‘patient justice’ where ‘they’ represent 
‘violence’. President Bush also informs the US people of the righteousness of ‘our cause’. I 
argue that President Bush constructs ‘our cause’ to be the eternal battle between good and evil. 
Therefore in this quote the ‘war on terrorism’ is constructed as a component in an eternal battle 
between the forces of good/God and the forces of evil/Satan. In both quotations above, President 
Bush has constructed ‘them’ as evil because ‘they’ performed ‘evil, despicable acts of terror’. 
Thus the acts were evil and the method (terrorism) was evil. Furthermore, ‘they’, the perpetra-
tors, were evil. ‘They’ were the ‘very worst of human nature’.  
In the next quotation it is the ideology behind the attacks that is constructed as evil. 
‘They’ justify their actions as jihad (holy war). Thus another aspect in their construction as evil 
was to disassociate ‘them’ from such claims to righteousness. Below I will repeat a short version 
of the quotation presented in chapter section 5.1 in connection with the ‘Islam is peace’ dis-
  
course that I delineated at the early stage of the construction of a ‘war on terrorism’ (Bush, 
2001b):   
The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and 
the vast majority of Muslim clerics ─ a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam.[…] 
Its [Islam’s] teachings are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme 
the name of Allah. The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself (2: 3: 
1 - 4: 10). 
In the context of constructing a religious dualism between ‘us’ as good and ‘them’ as evil, 
President Bush here discredits ‘their’ call to religion. As Lazar and Lazar point out, the enemies’ 
call to religion is not only discredited, but it is discredited as wicked and indeed as evil: it ‘per-
verts the peaceful teachings of Islam’. ‘They’ ‘blaspheme the name of Allah’ and ‘they’ are in 
fact ‘traitors to their own faith’. Furthermore, ‘they’ are portrayed in this manner not only by an 
outsider (President Bush); ‘they’ are also constructed as being depicted in this way from the 
inside. ‘They’ ‘practise a fringe form of Islamic extremism’ that has been ‘rejected by Muslim 
scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics’ (Lazar and Lazar, 2004: 236-238). I therefore 
suggest that President Bush here attempts discursively to remove any claim to righteousness by 
‘them’ and thus constructs ‘them’ as utterly evil.  
This section shows how President Bush at en early stage constructed ‘them’ as thor-
oughly evil and’ us’ as thoroughly good.  I also point to a development in the early stage of my 
material where the evil category is expanded from evil acts to evil methods, to evil perpetrators, 
and finally to an evil ideology justifying the actions of ‘them’. In the next two sections I will 
first analyse how President Bush compares the situation today with the Second World War and 
the Cold War. I will then analyse how the category of evil is later developed to include entire 
states.  
 
5.3.2 Evil has Returned 
President Bush compares today’s situation with the Second World War and the Cold War. I 
present two quotations concerning this comparison: from Text 2, the ‘early days’, which was 
directed at the US people (Bush, 2001b); and Text 4, the speech at the UN, which is dated ap-
proximately two months later (Bush, 2001d): 
We are not deceived by their pretenses to piety. We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all 
the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions ─ by 
abandoning every value except the will to power ─ they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and 
totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history’s unmarked grave of 
discarded lies (2: 4: 25 - 5: 3). 
  
The United Nations was founded in this cause. In a second world war, we learned there is no isolation from 
evil. We affirmed that some crimes are so terrible they offend humanity, itself. And we resolved that the 
aggressions and ambitions of the wicked must be opposed early, decisively, and collectively, before they 
threaten us all. That evil has returned, and that cause is renewed (4: 1: 14-18).  
When analysing these two quotations, it can be fruitful to return to the dualism in Manichaeism. 
Manichaeism’s dualism has two roots (Thomassen, 2004). First, it draws on the ontological 
dualism between mind and matter as presented in Greek philosophy. Second, it draws on the 
view from Zarathustra where the world is viewed as a battle between good and evil. The battle is 
between a God of truth and justice that is up against the evil powers of violence and lies. 
Manichaeism is hence a synthesis of ontological dualism that is consistent with the opposition 
between mind and matter and an ethical dualism of good and evil. According to Thomassen, 
Manichaeism brought with it one more notion from Zarathustra ─ namely the vision of world 
history as a progressing process where the battle between good and evil is fought. History is 
leading up to a final battle where the forces of good shall overcome the forces of evil, and this 
world will crumble and a new way of life will surface where truth and justice will rule pure and 
undiluted (Thomassen, 2004).  
In the first quotation above, ‘we’ are the people of the United States, and again I argue 
that President Bush uses a strategy of (e)vilification where ‘they’ are evil through their actions 
as objects of ‘our’ perceptual vision. ‘They’ are similar to some ‘kind’ that ‘we’ have ‘seen be-
fore’. According to David Frum, President Bush’s former speech writer, the single most power-
ful line in the speech quoted above was the observation that political Islam would follow Na-
zism, fascism and communism (the latter hastily renamed ‘totalitarianism’ for fear of offending 
China) into ‘history's unmarked grave of discarded lies’ (Frum, 2003: 147). I support the argu-
ment that this is indeed a powerful line and that it could be interpreted as ‘us’ representing light 
and the purity of truth and ‘them’ representing darkness (‘an unmarked grave’) and polluted 
lies. Through this statement President Bush also makes it clear that ‘we’ will win the battle 
against ‘them’ – thus indicating already the material outcome of a ‘war on terrorism’. 
The second quotation is from Text 4, the speech to the General Assembly in the UN in 
November 2001, so ‘we’ are here the civilized nations in the world (Bush, 2001d).17 President 
Bush argues here that what ‘we’ learned in the Second World War was that the civilized had ‘no 
isolation from evil’. Because of what ‘we’ experienced last time, ‘we’ now know how to deal 
with the ‘wicked’. ‘We’ must oppose ‘them’ ‘early, decisively, and collectively’. Thus the force 
                                                 
17 President Bush began his speech by stating: ‘Every civilized nation here today is resolved to keep the most 
basic commitment of civilization: We will defend ourselves and future against terror and lawless violence’ 
(Bush, 2001d, 4: 1: 11-13). I will elaborate on this statement in the next chapter. 
  
of ‘evil has returned’, and if ‘we’ do not want to experience the same crimes, the crimes that are 
‘so terrible that they offend humanity, itself’, ‘we’ must oppose the ‘wicked’. I argue that this 
quotation has an apocalyptic ring to it: ‘we’, the forces of good, have to unite in the reassumed 
battle against evil.  
Approximately two-and-a-half months later the discursive construction of ‘them’ as evil 
was further expanded and reached a new climax.  
 
5.3.3 An Axis of Evil 
In Text 5 ─ the State of the Union Address in late January 2002 ─ President Bush declared the 
existence of an ‘axis of evil’. At this time the initial military attack on Afghanistan was over 
and, according to Gregory, the naming of the ‘axis of evil’ was an unmistakable echo of ex-US 
President Reagan’s characterization of the former USSR as an ‘evil empire’ (Gregory, 2004: 
48). When President Bush announced the existence of an ‘axis of evil’, he was drawing on both 
the ‘evil empire’ and the Second World War’s fascist coalition of ‘axis powers’ (Bush 2002a): 
Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies 
with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September the 11th. 
But we know their true nature. North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruc-
tion, while starving its citizens. Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an un-
elected few repress the Iranian people’s hope for freedom. Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward 
America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear 
weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its 
own citizens ─ leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed 
to international inspections ─ then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide 
from the civilized world. States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to 
threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and 
growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. 
They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of in-
difference would be catastrophic (5: 4: 3 - 19). 
The ‘axis of evil’ section of the State of the Union speech was written by former speechwriter 
David Frum. His assignment was to write a justification for the US to go to war in Iraq (Frum, 
2003: 224). According to Frum, there were dozens of people across the government working on 
the 2002 State of the Union speech. He was writing what he calls a ‘hawkish draft’; others were 
working on completely different versions of the speech. In hindsight it is clear that the hawks 
won the internal disagreements over which line of argument to follow. In his original draft, 
Frum had applied the term ‘axis of hatred’ but this was changed to evil to ‘use the theological 
language that Bush had made his own since September 11 […]’ (Frum, 2003: 238). Berthelsen 
  
claims that Iran and North Korea were included into the ‘axis of evil’ so that the speech would 
not sound like a direct declaration of war against Iraq (Berthelsen, 2005: 67).  
The first important link in the quotation in constructing ‘them’ as an ‘axis of evil’ was to 
connect ‘regimes that sponsor terror’ to ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (WMD). It is not the 
weapons in themselves that are the problem, as several good states have WMD ─ the problem is 
that ‘they’ hate ‘us’, are evil and will use WMD next time that ‘they’ attack ‘us’.  
Furthermore, President Bush claims to ‘know their true nature’, which in this relation, in 
my opinion, can be seen as both demonization (‘they’ are not only bad, ‘they’ are evil) and natu-
ralization (‘they’ are evil by nature) of ‘them’. In the quotation, Iraq is the only regime that 
President Bush directly links to terrorism: ‘Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America 
and to support terror’. President Bush leaves nothing out when he depicts just how evil the Iraqi 
regime really is: ‘This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its 
own citizens -- leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children.’ President Bush 
also claims that ‘they’ ‘have something to hide’, clearly hinting at WMD.  
In the above quotation from Text 4, President Bush proclaimed that ‘evil has returned’, 
and that ‘we’ in the civilized world must oppose the ‘wicked’. Now in Text 5, approximately 
two-and-a-half months later, the wicked have specific names, thus ‘a geography of evil’18 has 
been constructed. The ‘axis of evil’ constitute ‘states like these’ and more importantly for the 
construction of a ‘war on terrorism’; ‘their terrorist allies’. Thus, in terms of an oppositional 
structured good-evil discourse, evil is a nodal point to which the other moments ─ ‘evil re-
gimes’, ‘WMD’ and ‘terrorist allies’ ─ are linked through a chain of equivalence. This con-
structs a naturalized version of ‘them’ as evil. This three-headed monster ─ ‘them’ ─ driven by 
‘hatred,’ ‘could attack’ ‘us’ and thus ‘they’ could create a catastrophe. The vital word here is 
could. I view this as preparation for the new security strategy ─ Text 7 ─ where the principle of 
pre-emptive action is introduced. The next chapter section will discuss how this new principle is 
constructed as a common-sense strategy in the ‘war on terrorism’.  
One last quotation is presented in this section that I will argue can be seen as an extension 
of the particularistic picture painted by President Bush in the ‘axis of evil’ speech, this time 
regarding the imputed existence of a universal moral truth. President Bush below argues (Bush, 
2002b):  
Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the language of right and wrong. I 
disagree. Different circumstances require different methods, but not different moralities. Moral truth is the 
same in every culture, in every time, and in every place. Targeting innocent civilians for murder is always 
                                                 
18 I borrow the term from Gregory (2004: 48). 
  
and everywhere wrong. Brutality against women is always and everywhere wrong. There can be no 
neutrality between justice and cruelty, between the innocent and the guilty. We are in a conflict between 
good and evil, and America will call evil by its name. By confronting evil and lawless regimes, we do not 
create a problem, we reveal a problem. And we will lead the world in opposing it (6: 5: 15-23). 
When President Bush spoke at West Point, approximately four months after the ‘axis of evil’ 
speech, he made it quite clear that there exists a moral truth and that it is universal both in time 
and space: ‘Moral truth is the same in every culture, in every time, and in every place’ (Bush, 
2002b). Contrary to what President Bush states in this quote, I assert that what is considered 
morally right and wrong is dependent on both time and space. That is, however, not the main 
point. The point is how President Bush represents a ‘moral truth’ as an absolutist fact. If we 
return to the dualism in Manichaeism, it is on display in the quotation above. ‘We’ are repre-
sented as the bearers of this eternal ‘moral truth’ (because ‘we’ know it exists). In addition, two 
more moments are linked to ‘us’, namely ‘we’ are represented as the ‘innocent’ and as having 
‘justice’ on our side, and in opposition to ‘us’, ‘they’ are ‘guilty’ and ‘cruel’. President Bush 
again highlights the absolutism of the categories. There are only two options: either ‘us’ (inno-
cent and just) or ‘them’ (guilty and cruel) ─ ‘there can be no neutrality between’ the two. Fur-
thermore, it is stated quite simply that: ‘We are in a conflict between good and evil, and 
America will call evil by its name’. It is clear that ‘we’, the US, are good because ‘we’ will con-
front evil, thus ‘we’ have to be good. In relation to this, Svendsen makes a valid point. He ar-
gues that the evil that the US is fighting is only the evil that is viewed as a threat to the US. Thus 
the US is not doing anything with evil terrorists that attack the enemies of the US.    Svendsen 
points to Florida where Jed Bush, the President’s brother, is governor, and his protection of anti-
Castro terrorists that have both hijacked aeroplanes and boats without persecution. It seems that 
because Cuba is defined as evil, any anti-Cuban terrorism is good and thus not in need of com-
bating (Svendsen, 2002). 
I argue that there is a sense of duty reflected in the quotation above. Because ‘we’ are 
good, it is ‘our’ duty to ‘call evil by its name’ and thus it is ‘our’ duty to fight evil. It is clear 
who ‘we’ have a duty to fight: ‘evil and lawless regimes’ (three of them we know by name). 
Finally, President Bush points out that by fighting evil ‘we do not create a problem, we 
reveal a problem. And we will lead the world in opposing it’. The problem that ‘we’ reveal is the 
problem of evil, and it is ‘our’ duty to lead the (good) world into battle against evil. This sense 




5.3.4. On a Mission from God?  
In Bob Woodward’s book, Bush at War, Woodward describes a meeting between President 
Bush and his Senior Advisor Karl Rove some days after 11 September 2001. Rove was in the 
Oval Office and President Bush told him that just as his father’s generation was ‘called’ in the 
Second World War, our generation was ‘called’ now. ‘“I’m here for a reason”, Bush said, “and 
this is going to be how we’re going to be judged”’ (Woodward, 2002: 205). I do not claim that 
President Bush believes that he is chosen by God to lead this mission against evil. Rather, my 
suggestion is that President Bush portrays the ‘war on terrorism’ as a mission of good fighting 
evil, and that it can be fruitful to deconstruct this aspect of the construction of the war through a 
religious lens. When it comes to religion, the US is the exception to the general rule that the 
progress of modernity erodes commitment to religion in society (Buzan, 2004: 157). According 
to Singer, poll after poll show that Americans are much more religious than the citizens of any 
other developed country (Singer, 2004: 92). According to Singer, more than eight out of ten 
people in the US still say that God is important in their lives (in Europe fewer than half say the 
same). About 94 per cent of people in the US believe in God, 89 per cent in heaven and 72 per 
cent in hell and the devil (Singer, 2004). My focus in this thesis is not on statistics. I therefore 
see the numbers above as indicators and as an opening for interpretations rather than ‘facts’. 
They could indicate that when President Bush applied theological language after 11 September 
2001 he would have got better resonance with a US public than with, for example, a European 
public. The first quotation in this section was directed at a US audience only nine days after the 
attacks on 11 September (Bush 2001b):  
Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our grief and anger we have found our 
mission and our moment. […] Our nation ─ this generation ─ will lift a dark threat of violence from our 
people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage (2: 8: 17- 21).  
In this quotation President Bush constructs the attacks as ‘great harm has been done to us’, but 
‘in our grief and anger’ ‘we’ found ‘our mission’. I will argue that ‘our mission’ is linked to 
‘our nation’ and that ‘our moment’ is linked to ‘this generation’. As mentioned in the introduc-
tion to this section, in the dualism of Manichaeism the light represents a God of truth and justice 
that is fighting the battle initiated by darkness representing the evil powers of violence and lies. 
I argue that there is a clear religious representation in the quotation above. President Bush 
frames the situation as battle between ‘them’ (the dark forces of violence) and ‘us’ (the nation of 
the US). Because of the great harm that was done to ‘us’, ‘we’ the US ‘found’ our mission and it 
is taking place right now. Therefore ‘we’ are destined to lead the world in this mission against 
evil. The USA will ‘rally the world’ to ‘our’ mission by ‘our’ actions and ‘our courage’.  
  
I interpret the rhetoric above as representing an apocalyptic view of history. As mentioned 
above in Manichaeism there is a view of history as a progressive process leading to a final battle 
between good and evil where good wins and a new order consisting of truth and justice will 
emerge. According to Thomassen, this view of history has also influenced other religions. We 
find it both in Judaism, for example, in the book of Daniel and in Christianity in the Book of 
Revelation and the Apocalypse of John. An apocalyptic view of history is also incorporated in 
Islam. What is interesting is that Judaism, Christianity and Islam include a new element into the 
view of history that is not as strong in Manichaeism, namely the idea of a chosen people. Hence 
the apocalyptic battle between good and evil is not only on the ethical and ontological level but 
also a battle between different groups of people. Social dualism is thus constructed in addition to 
ethical and ontological dualism. These three separate dualisms are often used in different com-
binations. According to Thomassen, the most common combination is between social and ethi-
cal dualism, which leads to the view that one’s own group represents good while ‘they’ repre-
sent evil. When this is combined with monotheism, as is required in Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam, the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ become even more fundamental (Thomassen, 
2004).  According to Singer, 53 per cent of US adults believe in the Apocalypse, and he points 
out that projecting this prophecy on to the world can lead to the view that the US nation is lead-
ing a divine mission and therefore the nation’s enemies are demonized (Singer, 2004: 208). My 
initial thought was that President Bush would tone down his religious rhetoric when he ad-
dressed the UN, but I was surprised to see no marked differences in this regard when I analysed 
the empirical material (Bush, 2001d):  
We stand for the permanent hopes of humanity, and those hopes will not be denied. We’re confident, too, 
that history has an author who fills time and eternity with his purpose. We know that evil is real, but good 
will prevail against it. This is the teaching of many faiths, and in that assurance we gain strength for a long 
journey. It is our task ─ the task of this generation ─ to provide the response to aggression and terror. We 
have no other choice, because there is no other peace. We did not ask for this mission, yet there is honor in 
history’s call. We have a chance to write the story of our times, a story of courage defeating cruelty and 
light overcoming darkness. This calling is worthy of any life, and worthy of every nation. So let us go for-
ward, confident, determined, and unafraid (4: 7: 16-25). 
In this quotation President Bush first constructs God as the ‘author’ of ‘history’ and God ‘fills 
time and eternity with his purpose’. I interpret this to mean that President Bush sees the situation 
in an apocalyptic manner where ‘evil is real, but good will prevail against it’. He goes on to 
state that ‘this is the teaching of many faiths’. He further repeats what he spoke to the US audi-
ence two months earlier: that it is now time to respond to evil, this is ‘the task of this genera-
tion’. According to President Bush, history has an author: God. Thus when he states that ‘there 
  
is honor in history’s call’, I take this as an indication of President Bush implying that he has, 
and thus logically ‘we’ have, a call from God. And this call is a call to action because ‘we have 
no other choice, because there is no other peace.’ President Bush also repeats the apocalyptic 
religious rhetoric of ‘courage defeating cruelty and light overcoming darkness’.  
With this worldview, where the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are constructed in 
such an absolutist manner, who is defined as belonging to ‘us’ and who belongs to ‘them’ be-
comes crucial. Throughout the empirical material, the ‘us’ and ‘them’ changes across the spec-
tre, from ‘us’ being the US people and ‘them’ being the perpetrators of the attacks on 11 Sep-
tember, until ‘us’ is civilization with ‘them’ being barbarism. But I assert that in the battle be-
tween good and evil President Bush clearly limits the ‘us’ and constructs it as a common identity 
for people of the United States (Bush 2002c): 
Just three days removed from these events, Americans do not yet have the distance of history. But our 
responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil. War has been 
waged against us by stealth and deceit and murder. This nation is peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger. 
The conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others. It will end in a way, and at an hour, of our 
choosing (7: 8: 3-7).19 
When speaking to a US audience, President Bush constructs the response to the terrorist attacks 
as a divine mission for the US. The US has a ‘responsibility to history’ (that is, God) to ‘rid the 
world of evil’. Through a religious lens, this could be viewed as a construction of the US people 
as a chosen people to fight the battle that was initiated by evil and fulfil the apocalyptic proph-
ecy: ‘The conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others. It will end in a way, and at an 
hour, of our choosing’.  
This chapter section has analysed the discursive construction of the ‘war on terrorism’ in 
the light of what I argue is religious dualism expressed in the empirical material. I have shown 
how the evil category is expanded from evil acts to states, by constructing ‘them’ as evil. The 
dualism in the former world religion of Manichaeism has been utilized to highlight the moral 
dualism of good and evil that I argue is present in my empirical material. I have further argued 
for a dualistic division between ‘us’ and ‘them’ that is framed as an eternal battle between the 
forces of good and evil, where ‘we’ the US represent pure goodness and different constructions 
of ‘them’ are  represented as wholly evil.  
The next and final analytical chapter section will analyse my empirical material in the 
light of another oppositional structure: namely the dualism of ‘us’ represented as civilization and 
‘them’ represented as barbarism. 
                                                 
19 The quote is from the official National Security Strategy of 2002, where quotes from speeches by President 
Bush are used as introductions to the different sections of the report (Bush, 2002c) 
  
 
5.4 Civilization and Barbarism 
Gregory points out that almost immediately after 11 September 2001, President Bush announced 
that ‘barbarians had declared war’ on the United States, and that this discursive framing of the 
situation as a conflict between civilization and barbarism had performative force. Gregory fur-
ther reiterates a story from the 2000 presidential election campaign, where George W. Bush had 
recalled growing up in a world were there was no doubt about the identity of America’s ‘other’. 
‘It was “us” versus “them” and it was clear who [“they”] were’, he said. ‘Today, we’re not sure 
who “they” are: but we know they’re there’20 (Gregory, 2004: 48). Of course, after 11 Septem-
ber President Bush was sure who ‘they’ were and, still according to Gregory, he reactivated the 
interpretative dispositions of the Cold War: ‘the sense of endangerment ascribed to all the activi-
ties of the other, the fear of internal challenge and subversion, the tendency to militarize all re-
sponses, and the willingness to draw the line of superiority and inferiority between us and them’ 
(Gregory, 2004).  
This chapter section will explore how a discursive construction of ‘us’ representing civili-
zation and ‘they’ representing barbarism is reflected in my empirical material, and how this is 
related to the construction of the ‘war on terrorism’. As in the previous chapter sections, the 
civilized–barbarian dichotomy is my construction that I am applying to the material in what I 
call a civilization–barbarism discourse. As in the ‘us’–‘them’ discourse, there is no ultimate 
distinction between the categories: sometimes ‘us’ as civilization is used to describe the US and 
sometimes ‘us’ as civilization is used to denote a larger entity, either the US with its friends and 
allies or sometimes even representing all of the world’s nations that are defined as civilized by 
President Bush. This, of course, has consequences for the construction of the barbarians. The 
larger one constructs the category of civilization the fewer barbarians there are, and vice versa. 
In the course of this chapter section, first in 5.4.1, I will introduce different definitions of the 
terms barbarism and civilization and consequences resulting from being defined as one or the 
other. Section 5.4.2 will focus on the question of how the barbarians are made visible in my 
empirical material. Furthermore, in 5.4.3 I will argue for an intertextual relation between Text 2 
and 3 of my material: namely the material consequences of a particular rhetorical construction 
of barbarism and how civilization should deal with that. Section 5.4.4 will show how President 
Bush continues and expands on the civilization and barbarism categories, and how the ‘war on 
                                                 
20 I would argue that this way of understanding the relationship between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is similar to Hunting-
ton’s notion as presented in 5.1, that ‘we’ know who ‘we’ are when ‘we’ know who ‘we’ are against (Hunting-
ton, 2002: 21). In my opinion this projects a dualistic worldview of friends and enemies. 
  
terrorism’ is discursively extended beyond the war in Afghanistan. Finally, section 5.4.5 will 
analyse how framing the situation as a battle between civilization and barbarism legitimizes 
exceptional actions in the ‘war on terrorism’.  
 
5.4.1 Constructing Barbarians 
Danchev suggests three different paths in defining barbarian. First, etymologically a barbarian 
is a foreigner, one whose language and customs differ from the speaker’s. Second, historically a 
barbarian developed from someone who was not a Greek, to one living outside the Roman Em-
pire and its civilization, followed by one outside the Christian civilization, and finally with the 
Italians of the Renaissance, one from a nation outside Italy. Third, a barbarian can be defined as 
a rude, wild uncivilized person (Danchev, 2003: 195). Salter elaborates on the trope barbarian 
as lacking in manners, language and morals, but not in organization since the barbarians repre-
sent a violent threat to the civilized inside. The space of the barbarian illustrates the limits of the 
political community, since the figure of the barbarian, either alone or in a horde, acts as the 
constitutive outside of the polis (Salter, 2002: 4). Barbarians are always depicted in relation to a 
standard of civilization, and are always defined in relation to a lack of civilization. In this way 
barbarism is the mirror to civilization (Salter, 2002:18). According to Salter, civilization was 
from the start defined as the opposition to barbarism. Civilization was first understood as a 
process of cultivation, linked to both manners and agriculture and for a European identity. The 
term civilization first appeared in French in 1767 and in English in 1772, in opposition to barba-
rism. The concept was used in an imperial context both as a support for and a critique of the 
process of European expansion. Civilization was in the nineteenth century taken to represent a 
mission of homogenization and ‘improvement’. Thus the rhetoric of civilization was soon ap-
propriated by imperial ideology to mean the ‘civilizing mission’ (Salter, 2002:15). 
Barbarian get its meaning from being both outside and different from the ‘us’, either as a 
people, religion, empire or state. The definition of a barbarian as one lacking morals and man-
ners can be connected to the moral dualism between good and evil as discussed in the previous 
chapter section. In addition to being evil, the barbarians are depicted as an immediate threat to 
‘us’ ─ that is, civilization. In my view these points are important for at least two reasons. First, 
because it refers to a basic dualistic notion of ‘us’ (the civilized on the inside) and ‘them’ (the 
barbarians who are displaced beyond the boundary of civilization – on the outside). Being de-
fined as outside the sphere of civilization implies that the rules that ‘we’, the civilized, live by do 
not apply to ‘them’, the barbarians. Hence being defined as barbarians has consequences for 
how ‘we’ conduct ourselves in relation to ‘them’. Second, ‘they’, the barbarians, are perceived 
  
as a threat to ‘us’, to our civilization ─ ‘they’ are violent while ‘we’ are not, ‘they’ are aggres-
sive and ‘we’ are not. Being defined as barbarians thus implies violence, for ‘they’ are per-
ceived as ‘our’ enemy by ‘nature’. Since the civilized and the barbarians have always been at 
war, the discursive distinction between civilization and barbarism as a feature of the ‘war on 
terrorism’ involves a naturalization of this war. 
The last aspect of the above definitions of civilization and barbarism upon which to 
elaborate is the imperial legacy of the concepts. The early discoverers, the conquistadors and the 
priests ‘discovering’ America thought that they brought a universal truth to the primitive bar-
barians. The conquistadors posited a single god, enjoying a universalistic religion applicable to 
human beings equally. In their meeting with the pagan barbarians they saw only two strategies: 
either conquer and convert, or conquer and destroy/eliminate. According to Connolly, the con-
quistadores mostly pursued the last option and the priests the first, because they believed that 
even barbarians had souls and could come to acknowledge the Christian faith (Connolly, 1989: 
326-328). With this reference I want to highlight the dualism in the reasoning of options when 
faced with otherness. Salter also points out that the ascription of civilization or barbarism is not 
a neutral objective description, but rather that a discourse employing this distinction has specific 
imperial overtones. Salter argues for a relationship between a civilization–barbarism discourse 
and identity and culture. Culture, like civilization, becomes something that ‘we’ have, something 
that distinguishes ‘us’ from ‘them’, the barbarians outside. Salter makes one more consequen-
tial distinction, which is that the possession of civilization justifies the conquest of barbarism 
and that the possession of civilization is marked by artefacts of culture (Salter, 2002: 12).  
This introduction suggests that there are serious consequences in invoking the rhetoric of 
a civilization–barbarism discourse with its relationship to culture and identity in the construc-
tion of a ‘war on terrorism’.  In the ‘war on terrorism’, ‘we’ possess culture and civilization and 
‘they’ are just barbarians. Hence, ‘we’ know what is right and true and ‘they’ hate ‘us’ for that, 
and with this, constructing ‘them’ as barbarians is similar to constructing ‘them’ as pure evil . 
Following the described logic of a dualism of reasoning, in dealing with both there are only two 
options: either conquer and convert, or eliminate and destroy. 
 
5.4.2 Making the Barbarians Visible 
The need for barbarians is not limited to questions of the larger context of geopolitics. Rather, it 
is a basic tool in the course of everyday meaning-making and identity formation. Rosenberg, for 
example, discusses our need for barbarians. In his view, the existence of barbarians emphasizes 
our own superiority and goodness. As he argues, there is nothing better for increasing social 
  
integration in a society than a horde of ‘barbarians at the gate’, or on the other side of the iron 
curtain, or at customs trying to get into ‘our’ superior civilized society, or, as he points out, hav-
ing barbarians on the other side of an invisible battleground where ‘we’ are fighting a ‘war 
against terrorism’ (Rosenberg, 2004). I agree with Rosenberg that the construction of ‘our’ en-
emy as barbarians is helpful for national moral. I moreover suggest that constructing the enemy 
as barbarians has further implications: it legitimizes violence from the civilized because bar-
barians are not protected by international law. International laws and rules concern the relations 
between states, not relations between civilization and barbarism. Barbarians are seen as a threat 
to states because under normal circumstances states are considered civilized entities that follow 
the rules and regulations set by the international community. However, if a situation is defined 
as exceptional, as for example barbarians threatening national security, then rules and regula-
tions are not unbreakable, even for the most civilized of nations. Thus barbarians, like suspected 
members of the al Qaeda organization, can be detained without abiding by the international 
rules for prisoners of war or human rights laws, as is done in Camp X-Ray within the US naval 
base at Guantanamo Bay on Cuba. Camp X-Ray can be seen as a ‘non-place’. It is at once out-
side Afghanistan and outside the continental US and so beyond the reach of US law (Gregory, 
2004: 66).   
As will become apparent in this chapter section, in the ‘war on terrorism’ it is not only 
the al Qaeda terrorists that are defined as barbarians, but also any state that harbours or aids 
terrorists. These states are constructed as a threat to civilization itself, hence ‘they’ are barbari-
ans. Barbarians by nature represent a threat to civilization. Therefore, if ‘we’ cannot civilize 
‘them’, ‘we’ have to destroy ‘them’. The barbarians in the ‘war on terrorism’ cannot be fought 
by containment like yesterday’s barbarians on the other side of the iron curtain. Today ‘they’ 
have to be eliminated before ‘they’ eliminate ‘us’.  
For the constructed dualism of the civilized–barbarian to work, it has to be possible to draw a 
clear line between ‘us’ and ‘them’. It has to be clear who ‘they’ are and who ‘we’ are and where 
the boundary between the civilized inside and the barbaric outside is drawn. In Text 2 of my 
empirical material President Bush constructed ‘them’ as ‘our’ enemy. ‘They’ are the barbarians 
from the outside, attacking ‘us’ the civilized inside. The question is again who attacked ‘our’ 
country’ (Bush 2001 b):  
The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known 
as al Qaeda.[…] This group and its leader ─ a person named Osama bin Laden ─ are linked to many other 
organizations in different countries, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan. There are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries. They are recruited from their 
  
own nations and neighborhoods and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan, where they are trained in 
the tactics of terror. They are sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot 
evil and destruction. […] The Taliban must act, and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or 
they will share in their fate (2: 2: 23 - 4: 5). 
Once again I would like to apply Laclau and Mouffe’s analytical category of a chain of equiva-
lence. By linking certain moments such as ‘al Qaeda’, ‘Osama bin Laden’, different ‘Islamic’ 
‘terror organizations’, ‘Afghanistan’ and the ‘Taliban’ to the nodal point ─ the attacks on 11 
September 2001 ─ President Bush strives to obtain closure in a civilization─barbarism dis-
course. In this discourse ‘they’, the barbarians, get their meaning from being a person (Osama 
bin Laden), a group (al Qaeda) a religion (Islam) and a state with its regime (Afghanistan and 
the Taliban). Lazar and Lazar identify this as a specific discursive strategy that they call ‘orien-
talization’ (Lazar and Lazar, 2004: 234-235). In the quote above, they identify the stereotype of 
the duplicitous Arab: not only irrational and immoral, Arabs are also credited with clever devi-
ous intrigue. The choice of the material process (to) plot, with reprehensible goals, is one way 
that this is highlighted: ‘They are recruited’ and ‘trained in the tactics of terror’ before ‘they’ 
‘are sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and 
destruction’ (Lazar and Lazar, 2004). I would argue that ‘orientalization’ can be viewed as a 
similar discursive strategy to constructing ‘them’ as barbarians. In the quotation above, the 
barbarians are constructed to be possibly everywhere. Thus ‘they’ can be where the civilized 
‘we’ would normally feel safe: in our own ‘neighborhoods’ and in ‘our’ ‘homes’. The barbari-
ans can be anywhere and everywhere, but here ‘they’ are made visible in Afghanistan, forcing 
the Taliban to choose, either to be part of civilization or to be considered as guilty and barbaric 
as the 11 September 2001 perpetrators. 
 
5.4.3 How to Deal with Barbarians 
Text 2 also makes it clear how civilized nations such as the US deal with the threat posed by the 
barbaric terrorists and ‘their’ sponsor states (Bush, 2001b):  
But the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it 
where it grows. Many will be involved in this effort, from FBI agents to intelligence operatives to the re-
servists we have called to active duty. All deserve our thanks, and all have our prayers. And tonight, a few 
miles from the damaged Pentagon, I have a message for our military: Be ready. I’ve called the Armed 
Forces to alert, and there is a reason. The hour is coming when America will act, and you will make us 
proud. This is not, however, just America’s fight. And what is at stake is not just America’s freedom. This 
is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and plural-
ism, tolerance and freedom. […] The civilized world is rallying to America’s side. They understand that if 
this terror goes unpunished, their own cities, their own citizens may be next. Terror, unanswered, cannot 
  
only bring down buildings; it can threaten the stability of legitimate governments. And you know what ─ 
we’re not going to allow it (2: 6: 3-22). 
To use Laclau and Mouffes’ terminology, in chapter section 5.2 I suggested that President Bush 
has constructed an ‘American way of life’ as a myth, a social space. Thus in the beginning of 
this quotation, it is the US that will ‘stop’, ‘eliminate’ and ‘destroy’ the barbaric terrorism as a 
threat to ‘our way of life’. According to Lazar and Lazar, President Bush also dehumanizes the 
enemy, which is constructed as a plant parasite – ‘it grows’ (Lazar and Lazar, 2004: 236). 
Within the US, ‘many will be involved in the effort’ to exterminate these parasites that threaten 
the ‘American way of life’. President Bush mentions the ‘FBI’ and ‘intelligence’ (CIA) as being 
part of the extermination process, but he also makes it clear that ‘America will act’ with its 
‘Armed Forces’.  
I view as particularly important in constructing the ‘war on terrorism’ the link between 
the paragraph where President Bush concludes that the appropriate US response is a militarized 
response (2: 6: 7-9) and the next where he states: ‘This is not, however, just America’s fight. And 
what is at stake is not just America’s freedom. This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s 
fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom’(2: 6: 
10-12). Until now, civilization has been the US, but here President Bush expands the civilization 
category and includes the entire (civilized) world into the extermination mission. Now it is the 
values of ‘all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom’ that are on the line. 
The ‘American way of life’ is based on these values, and now civilization in its broadest defini-
tion is equalled to these values. Therefore the attacks on the ‘American way of life’ became an 
attack on civilization itself, and thus all of civilization must be part of the war against the bar-
baric parasites in ‘our’ midst. As a consequence of this reasoning, President Bush also natural-
izes the process of going to war. Going to war in Afghanistan is constructed to be the only ap-
propriate response by civilization against barbarians. This makes sense since civilization and 
the US are constructed as carrying the same values: thus when the right response for the US is 
war, it is also the right response for civilization, and therefore ‘the civilized world is rallying to 
America’s side’. The civilized world is constructed to ‘understand’ that if the terrorist parasites 
and ‘their’ state sponsors are allowed to grow ‘unpunished’ and ‘unanswered’, ‘they’ will flour-
ish and threaten a symbol of civilization: ‘legitimate governments’. Thus a defining criterion for 
belonging to civilization becomes willingness to act, and to act with force. 
From a discourse analytical perspective, the above quotation could be seen as an example 
of an ‘extreme case formulation’, which is used in situations where it is possible that the audi-
ence will not accept a story or assertion (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 137). I assert that in this 
  
quotation President Bush is formulating the situation in an extreme manner when he invokes a 
civilization–barbarism discourse where the only option for civilization is to eliminate and de-
stroy those who are defined as barbarians. Thus I suggest that the quotation is intended to rally 
both national and international support for a militarized response in Afghanistan, and that the 
surest way to get that support is to maximize the threat that ‘they’ pose. I would also argue that a 
clear intertextual connection can be drawn between Texts 2 and 3 where the commencement of 
Operation Enduring Freedom is announced. As I have argued above in Text 2, President Bush 
frames the situation as extreme: it is civilization that is threatened by barbarians. In doing so he 
discursively legitimizes going to war in Afghanistan as the appropriate action for the civilized 
world when faced with barbarians (Bush, 2001c): 
On my orders, the United States’ military has begun strikes against al Qaeda terrorist training camps and 
military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. […] We are supported by the collective will of 
the world.[…] The United States of America is a friend to the Afghan people, and we are the friends of al-
most a billion worldwide who practice the Islamic faith. The United States of America is an enemy of those 
who aid terrorists and of the barbaric criminals who profane a great religion by committing murder in its 
name.[…] Today we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle is broader. Every nation has a choice to make. In 
this conflict, there is no neutral ground. If any government sponsors the outlaws and killers of innocents, 
they have become outlaws and murderers, themselves. And they will take that lonely path at their own peril 
(3: 1: 5 - 2: 11). 
This speech transformed the metaphoric ‘war on terrorism’ into a very real war. Even though 
President Bush uses rather clinical language in describing what the ‘United States military’ is 
doing, I would argue that it was not only ‘al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military instal-
lations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan’ that were destroyed by the ‘strikes’. According to 
Gregory, by May 2002 it was estimated that 1,300-3,500 civilians had died and 4,000-6,500 
civilians had been injured, many of them severely, as a direct result of American bombs and 
missiles (Gregory, 2004: 70).  
Jørgensen and Phillips discuss how different discourse analytical approaches have altered 
views on the role of discourse in the constitution of the world. In Fairclough’s critical discourse 
analysis, the discursive dimension together with other dimensions of social practice constitute 
our world, while in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, discourse itself is seen as fully con-
stitutive of our world (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 18-19). My point here is that the actions set 
in motion as a result of Text 3 had (and still have) grave material consequences. I will also argue 
that for the US as a Western state to initiate a war against an Islamic state without any retalia-
tion, the grounds for going to war had to been discursively legitimized as in Text 2, as civiliza-
tions fight against barbaric terrorists. Salter points out that the rhetorical well of the trope bar-
  
barism is so deep that waging war against barbarians trumps all other narratives (Salter, 2002: 
167). It therefore makes sense that President Bush claims that ‘we’ the US ‘are supported by the 
collective will of the world’ in going to war. In the quotation, the ‘Afghan people’ and Muslims 
in general are reassured that ‘we’ the US are their ‘friends’. However, in the very next sentence 
President Bush also makes it clear that even though not all Muslims are barbarians, all of the 
barbarians are Muslims: ‘[…] the barbaric criminals who profane a great religion by commit-
ting murder in its name’. In the same speech where he discursively initiated the war in Afghani-
stan, President Bush also states that the ‘war on terrorism’ does not end with Operation Endur-
ing Freedom. The threat being made is directed at other barbaric states: ‘If any government 
sponsors the outlaws and killers of innocents, they have become outlaws and murderers, them-
selves. And they will take that lonely path at their own peril’. Afghanistan was at that moment 
‘on the lonely path’; consequently other barbaric states would not have to wonder what ’their 
own peril’ would entail.  
 
5.4.4 The Battle is Broader 
In Text 4, the speech to the UN General Assembly in New York on 9 November 2001, two 
months after defining civilization as the values of ‘progress’, ‘pluralism’, ‘tolerance’ and ‘free-
dom’ and one month after initiating the war in Afghanistan, President Bush reinforced the need 
to fight the barbarians because of the immense threat that ‘they’ represent for civilization 
(Bush, 2001d). Thus there is an intertextual connection running through Texts 2, 3 and 4. In 
Text 4 President Bush continues and expands on the meaning of being defined as civilized or 
barbarians, and the consequences for the future if ‘we’ the civilized do not fight ‘them’ the bar-
barians right now. He also makes it clear that the ‘war on terrorism’ is not limited to the war in 
Afghanistan, but that it is part of a broader battle (Bush 2001 d): 
We meet in a hall devoted to peace, in a city scarred by violence, in a nation awakened to danger, in a 
world uniting for a long struggle. Every civilized nation here today is resolved to keep the most basic 
commitment of civilization: We will defend ourselves and our future against terror and lawless violence. 
[…] Every nation has a stake in this cause. As we meet, the terrorists are planning more murder ─ perhaps 
in my country, or perhaps in yours. They kill because they aspire to dominate. They seek to overthrow gov-
ernments and destabilize entire regions.[…] Few countries meet their exacting standards of brutality and 
oppression. Every other country is a potential target. And all the world faces the most horrifying prospect 
of all: These same terrorists are searching for weapons of mass destruction, the tools to turn their hatred 
into holocaust. They can be expected to use chemical, biological and nuclear weapons the moment they are 
capable of doing so. No hint of conscience would prevent it (4: 1: 10 - 3: 2). 
In the opening of the speech, New York is constructed as a ‘city scarred by violence’ and the US 
as ‘a nation awakened to danger’. The ‘hall’ of the UN is used as a symbol for ‘peace’, which 
  
again I would argue is a trait of civilization. In this hall the world is united ‘for a long struggle’. 
With the distinction ‘every civilized nation here today’, President Bush implies that not all na-
tions represented in the UN can be considered civilized, hence some are to be considered bar-
barians. In this first paragraph, ‘we’ the civilized are constructed as representing ‘peace’ and 
‘we’ are defending ‘ourselves’, thus ‘we’ are under normal circumstances non-aggressive. 
President Bush takes for granted that the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 were only a 
beginning and that further attacks by the barbarians on civilization are inevitable: ‘As we meet, 
the terrorists are planning more murder ─ perhaps in my country, or perhaps in yours.’ The 
barbarians ‘kill’ and ‘their’ goals are constructed as ‘to dominate’ and to ‘overthrow govern-
ments and destabilize entire regions’ and enforce ‘standards of brutality and oppression’.  
President Bush also constructs how ‘these’ same barbarians are to achieve ‘their’ goals: ‘These 
same terrorists are searching for weapons of mass destruction, the tools to turn their hatred into 
holocaust’. Not only are ‘they’ trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction, ‘they’ will use 
them as soon as ‘they’ are in possession of them: ‘No hint of conscience would prevent it’. 
‘They’ are here constructed as barbarians, ‘they’ kill to dominate, ‘they’ want to force the entire 
world into living by ‘their’ ‘exacting standards of brutality and oppression’ through the use of 
weapons of mass destruction, ‘they’ represent an enormous threat to ‘us’ (civilization) because 
‘they’ are barbarians. This notion is reinforced in the succeeding paragraph, where President 
Bush argues that the threat faced by civilization impels action: 
This threat cannot be ignored. This threat cannot be appeased. Civilization, itself, the civilization we share, 
is threatened. History will record our response, and judge or justify every nation in this hall. The civilized 
world is now responding. We act to defend ourselves and deliver our children from a future of fear. We 
choose the dignity of life over a culture of death. We choose lawful change and civil disagreement over co-
ercion, subversion, and chaos. These commitments ─ hope and order, law and life ─ unite people across 
cultures and continents. Upon these commitments depend all peace and progress. For these commitments, 
we are determined to fight (4: 3: 3-11). 
I would argue that with the three first lines in this quotation President Bush depicts the ‘war on 
terrorism’ as a question of the survival of civilization itself. In chapter section 5.3 I argued that 
President Bush equalled ‘history’ with God. I therefore interpret the sentence ‘History will re-
cord our response, and judge or justify every nation in this hall ’ to mean that every nation in 
the UN will be judged by God according to how they respond to the threat that barbarism poses 
to civilization. This can be seen as an extreme statement, because civilization here represents all 
of the civilized people in the world ─ thus the meaning of civilization here represents the highest 
entity to which civilized people in this world can feel they belong. There is a horde of barbari-
ans threatening civilization, not only the civilized US, but all of the civilized people on this 
  
planet. As in the quotations from Texts 2 and 3 in this chapter section, President Bush again 
(re)presents a willingness to act militarily against the barbarians as a defining characteristic of 
the civilized: ‘The civilized world is now responding’.  The civilized world is here the US and its 
allies in the war in Afghanistan. When President Bush goes on to justify why the US and its 
allies ‘act to defend ourselves’, he also utilizes two more constructions. First, by articulating the 
oppositional character of the civilized and the barbarians as, for example, ‘the dignity of life’ as 
opposed to a ‘culture of death’, President Bush continues to elaborate on the threat that ‘they’ 
pose to ‘us’. ‘They’ stand for the opposite values and culture than ‘we’ do, and if ‘we’ do not 
respond, ‘they’ will enforce ‘their’ values and culture on ‘us’. Hence not fighting ‘them’ will 
have enormous consequences for civilization: ‘coercion, subversion and chaos’. The second 
effect of this paragraph is the transformation of elements into moments in the context of a civili-
zation─barbarism discourse. This is achieved through linking elements like ‘dignity of life’ and 
‘lawful change and civil disagreement’ to the nodal point of civilization, as well as linking ele-
ments like ‘a culture of death’ and ‘coercion, subversion and chaos’ to the nodal point of bar-
barism. It thus becomes sensible that ‘we’ should fight ‘them’ when given only these two op-
tions of a future. After elaborating on the extreme character and intentions of ‘them’ (the bar-
barians), President Bush makes it clear that the ‘war on terrorism’ goes beyond Afghanistan 
(Bush, 2001d): 
Yet, even beyond Resolution 1373, more is required, and more is expected of our coalition against terror. 
[…] As I’ve told the American people, freedom and fear are at war. We face enemies that hate not our 
policies, but our existence; the tolerance of openness and creative culture that defines us (4: 5: 27 - 7: 8). 
Thus the war in Afghanistan was only the beginning of the ‘war on terrorism’: ‘more is 
required, and more is expected of our coalition against terror’. In the last two sentences in this 
quotation President Bush constructs the US as representing civilization. The barbarians attacked 
the US because the US possesses the values and culture that actually defines civilization: ‘toler-
ance’ and ‘openness’ as opposed to the barbarian values of ‘brutality’ and ‘oppression’. The 
barbarians that attacked the US, and the extended barbarians still threatening the 
US/civilization, do so first and foremost because ‘they’ are barbarians and not because ‘they’ 







5.4.5 Making the Exception 
‘Sovereign is he who decides the exception’ is supposedly the German philosopher Carl 
Schmitt’s key claim (Gregory, 2004: 72). Walker elaborates that Schmitt’s sovereignty involved 
the capacity to decide the exception that legitimates the norm (Walker, 1993: 165). This is part 
of a much longer line of arguments, and it concerns sovereignty within a state and not within a 
system of states, but I would argue that this claim can be used in an effort to deconstruct the 
‘war on terrorism’. In relation to a civilization–barbarism discourse, it is precisely the ability to 
make the exception – the capacity to suspend the law, ethics and morality and to suspend peace 
─ that is at stake. As Gregory points out, the exception – ex-capere – is literally that which is 
‘taken outside’ (Gregory, 2004: 62). I argue that President Bush and his administration in the 
‘war on terrorism’ are constructing the situation as exceptional: ‘they’ are represented as bar-
barians threatening the existence of civilization. The exceptionality is also reflected in Text 7: 
the official National Security Strategy of 2002 (Bush, 2002c). The security strategy has a guid-
ing principle of ‘a balance of power that favours freedom’ (Melby, 2004: 148), and this balance 
will be sustained through three main strategies (Bush 2002 c):     
We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good 
relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on 
every continent (7: 1: 19-21). 
It is the first strategy that relates to my purpose here: how a civilization–barbarism discourse is 
reflected in my material and how that relates to the discursive construction of the ‘war on terror-
ism’. The US’s strategy for defending the civilized goal of peace is to ‘fight terrorists and ty-
rants’. This fight could include pre-emptive action which is constructed as ‘common sense’ 
(Bush, 2002c): 
[…] as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before 
they are fully formed.[…] In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path 
of action (7: 2: 12-17). 
Melby points out that with the National Security Strategy of 2002, the principle of pre-emptive 
action was for the first time incorporated into US official security strategy. Since the Second 
World War this view of security is, according to Melby, fundamentally new (Melby, 2004: 153). 
The quotation above states quite simply that ‘the path to peace and security is the path of ac-
tion’. Sovereignty in international decision-making is also made clear (Bush, 2002c):  
While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will 
not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against 
such terrorists (7: 9:23-26). 
  
In this quotation a double move is made first: the US will ‘strive’ for international ‘support’ for 
its actions. However, the same sentence makes it perfectly clear that ‘we’ ‘will not hesitate to 
act alone’, thus the US will do whatever ‘we’ decide is appropriate. This could be interpreted to 
mean that the US’s rights are above the rights of the rest of the international community. As 
pointed out in chapter section 5.3, the link between terrorists, states that support terrorists as 
defined by the US, and WMD is here again crucial – in this case it legitimizes the new strategy 
of pre-emption. It is further legitimized as a defence of civilization against barbarism (Bush, 
2002c):  
The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action […] The 
United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption 
as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the 
world’s most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather (7: 18: 24 
- 19: 22). 
The US/civilization will not normally use pre-emptive force, but when faced with barbarians 
seeking weapons of mass destruction the US/civilization is compelled to make an exception to 
the norm and take action: ‘Yet in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively 
seek the world’s most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dan-
gers gather’. The construction of the exceptionality of the situation today, with barbarians pos-
ing an imminent threat to the US/civilization, serves to justify pre-emptive action by the US to 
eliminate that threat. I therefore return to the notion that the barbarian space functions as the 
limit of the political community. In ‘defending the peace’, the US suspends the norm of the in-













6. The ‘War on Terrorism’ Reframed 
In my introductory chapter to this thesis I presented my research question as: 
How was a ‘war on terrorism’ constructed as the appropriate response by the US to the 
terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001? 
I started to search for an answer in my empirical material and in the first two texts I identified 
two definitions made by President Bush that influenced the discursive trajectory to come. First, 
he defined the attacks of 11 September as acts of war, and accordingly he elevated the criminals 
behind the attacks to the status of war enemies. This also prepared the world for a warlike re-
sponse. In addition, this could be seen as the first step in making the 11 September attacks and 
the ‘war on terrorism’ into one. The second crucial discursive decision was to equate the terror-
ists with any state that harbours or aids terrorists and thus make the enemy more tangible than 
an elusive network of terrorists.    
In my further analysis of the empirical material, I identified four discourses that I argue 
are vital for the construction of the ‘war on terrorism’. The previous chapters have suggested 
that President Bush reasons by structuring signs in opposition to each other. In discursively con-
structing the ‘war on terrorism’, the main oppositional structure that I identified was the distinc-
tion between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Furthermore, I delineated three sub-discourses that could be seen 
as distinctive ways of ascribing specific qualities to either ‘us’ or ‘them’. The three sub-
discourses concerned the structured oppositions of freedom and fear, good and evil and civiliza-
tion and barbarism.  
I have further argued that a perpetual discursive reinforcement can be seen of the simplis-
tic dualism between ‘us’ and ‘them’ as the key component in discursively constructing the war. 
Furthermore, ‘us’ and ‘them’ were not only differentiated and set in opposition to each other; at 
the same time there was also a hierarchy imposed where the subordinate sign (‘them’) was 
placed outside the boundaries of what is significant and desirable. I have argued that reasoning 
in this manner with a simplistic paired zero-sum relation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ intensifies the 
level of conflict. I have viewed it as an attempt to unite through using the logic of confrontation: 
either you are with ‘us’ against ‘them’ or you are with ‘them’ and thus against ‘us’. 
My last assertion was that a central aspect of constructing the ‘war on terrorism’ was to 
present the situation as exceptional in time and space: the enemy could be anywhere at any time. 
In this exceptional situation ‘we’ are represented as holding the universal values of freedom, 
goodness (or Godliness) and civilization, and ‘they’ are represented with the particular values of 
fear, evil and barbarism. With these categories President Bush also constructed ‘them’ as an 
  
active enemy with the goal of eradicating ‘us’, ‘they’ are aggressive, ‘their’ goal is to terrorize 
‘us’, ‘they’ the evil ones initiated the battle against good, and barbarians are pounding at the 
gate.  
This thesis attempts to read President Bush against himself, to reframe the ‘war on terror-
ism’, so to speak. This started from a specific constructionist epistemological assumption, 
namely that our understanding and knowledge about the world is historically and culturally con-
tingent ─ that is, they are possible but not necessary. Thus, in an attempt to deconstruct the dis-
cursive ‘war on terrorism’, I saw it as important to examine how the ‘us’-‘them’ opposition was 
constructed in my material and through that to expose the contingent character of the categories. 
I utilized concepts from Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory as a ‘language of description’ to 
translate my empirical material. I have thus argued that President Bush strives to obtain closure 
in a particular discursive universe: the discourse of ‘us’ and ‘them’ with three sub-discourses. In 
this discursive universe, ‘us’ and ‘them’ are mutually exclusive categories where ‘we’ on the 
inside represent freedom, goodness and civilization and ‘they’ on the outside represent fear, evil 
and barbarism. However, by exposing the contingency of the categories, these representations 
are made more complicated. It opens up for alternative, albeit equally contingent, representa-
tions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ where even fear, evil and barbarism could exist inside the ‘us’. As an 
example I present a quotation from Harold Pinter’s Nobel lecture in 200521, where he volunteers 
to be a speechwriter for President Bush and proposes the following short address that President 
Bush should make on television to the nation (Pinter, 2005):  
God is good. God is great. God is good. My God is good. Bin Laden’s God is bad. His is a bad God. Sad-
dam’s God was bad, except he didn’t have one. He was a barbarian. We are not barbarians. We don’t chop 
people’s heads off. We believe in freedom. So does God. I am not a barbarian. I am the democratically 
elected leader of a freedom-loving democracy. We are a compassionate society. We give compassionate 
electrocution and compassionate lethal injection. We are a great nation. I am not a dictator. He is. I am not 
a barbarian. He is. And he is. They all are. I possess moral authority. You see this fist? This is my moral 
authority. And don't you forget it. 
Still within the discursive framing of an ‘us’-‘them’ discourse, Pinter uses irony to highlight the 
contingency of the ‘us’-‘them’ categories. Through this articulation Pinter presents an alterna-
tive fixing of the meaning of the nodal point and myth of ‘America’. Here the moments of free-
dom, goodness (Godliness) and civilization are fixed in such a way that ‘America’ is represented 
as embodying the opposite values: fear, evil and barbarism. Thus, in addition to emphasizing 
the contingency of the representations, Pinter criticizes the actions of the US.  
                                                 
21 Harold Pinter, Nobel laureate in literature 2005. Pinter’s Nobel Lecture, ‘Art, Truth and Politics’ can be found 
at http://nobelprize.org/literature/laureates/2005/pinter-lecture-e.html, accessed April 2006. 
  
With a starting point in constructionist epistemology, I have argued that there is a link between a 
discursive construction of the world and social actions. As stated in my introduction, I view the 
US today as a hegemon and thus I view it as important to understand what it does and how it 
does it. However, the importance and focus of my study has been from what premises and 
worldview the US starts. My focus has been on analysing the discursive construction of the ‘war 
on terrorism’ and to give a critical review of this construction by exposing the contingency of 
the particular representation of ‘us’ and ‘them’. In exposing the historical and cultural contin-
gency of the categories, I hope to have transformed them into potential objects for discussion 
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Annexe: The Empirical Material  
 
Text 1 (Bush, 2001a):  
‘Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation’ 11 September 2001 
 
Text 2 (Bush, 2001b):  
‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People’ 20 September 2001 
 
Text 3 (Bush, 2001c): 
‘Presidential Address to the Nation’ 7 October 2001 
 
Text 4 (Bush, 2001d): 
‘President Bush Speaks to United Nations’ 10 November 2001 
 
Text 5 (Bush, 2002a): 
‘State of the Union Address’ 29 September 2002 
 
Text 6 (Bush, 2002b): 
‘President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point’ 1 June 2002 
 
Text 7 (Bush, 2002c): 
‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’ September 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
